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This thesis examines the logistics accomplishments of
Reinvention Laboratories in attempting to improve business
practices within the Department of Defense. It documents five
cases in which over $342 million in annual savings were achieved
to show the potential of continuous improvement. It also
provides recommendations for further research and for investment
of resources to permit DoD logistics organizations to obtain
greater savings
.
This thesis provides a tool and a knowledge base useful to
existing and new Reinvention Labs. Through review of the lessons
learned and study of the barriers to success, it is hoped that
avoidance of the many pitfalls encountered with implementing
change can be avoided.
Through business process reengineering (BPR) and the
entrepreneurial spirit, DoD can transform its large and
inefficient logistics organizations into more flexible,
effective, streamlined institutions capable of rapidly adapting
to the changing needs of the Armed . Services. This thesis
illustrates how DoD, through the resource savings in
reengineering and reinvention, can generate funding to invest in
modernization to prepare for the missions identified in the DoD '
s
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the logistic
accomplishments of the Department of Defense (DoD)
Reinvention Laboratories and the impediments the
laboratories have faced in striving to improve logistics
efficiency and effectiveness. "By definition, a reinvention
lab is a place where experimentation takes place, where new
practices, processes, and procedures are tried." (Jones and
Thompson, 1997, p. 7) The Reinvention Laboratory
designation is given to organizations that have been
selected to implement entrepreneurial practices in
government through restructuring, reengineering,
reinventing, realigning, and rethinking in order to become
more efficient and effective. (Jones and Thompson, 1996, p.
1) These designated laboratories are permitted to waive
rules and regulations to institute innovative ideas or
processes that make the organizations work better and cost
less. This thesis evaluates the logistics Reinvention
Laboratories' efforts and experiences, and attempts to
identify factors that contribute to both successful and
unsuccessful reforms. The final goal is to:
1) Identify successful best practices and process
improvements so that they may be benchmarked or adapted by
similar organizations.
2) Recommend where further resources might be
invested to overcome barriers, enabling increased savings
and efficiency.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
To what extent have DoD sponsored Reinvention
Laboratories been successful in increasing logistics
efficiency and effectiveness and how has this contributed to
the Department of Defense's preparations for its future?
2. Secondary Research Questions
The secondary research questions are:
a. What has been accomplished by Reinvention Labs in
logistics?
b. What lesson can be extracted from Reinvention Lab
successes?
c. What barriers to logistics reinvention exist and
how can they be overcome?
This thesis will assess the logistics performance of
the current DoD Reinvention Laboratories. Based on a survey
submitted to the 226 Reinvention Laboratory points of
contact, lessons learned will be drawn based on success
stories and impediments to process improvement. The final
portion of this thesis will include suggestions from various
Reinvention Laboratories on what they recommend could, be
done to improve the existing waiver and reinvention process.
The goal is to provide newly designated, inexperienced
Reinvention Laboratories with tools and an understanding
they can use to improve their organizations.
C . BACKGROUND
The end of the Cold War has caused significant changes
in the outlook of the relative importance of the military in
comparison to other national interests. The large
discretionary funding allocated to the military is under
tremendous scrutiny. Many critics wish to reap "peace
dividend" benefits from the costly Cold War investment and
utilize this discretionary funding for other programs viewed
as more important. While tenaciously fighting to maintain
its constant $250 billion budget, the Department of Defense
is struggling to meet all of its requirements. This uphill
battle includes judiciously using its tightly constrained
budget to support contingency operations, to maintain its
costly, aging equipment, and to invest in modernization
programs that will enable it to meet the missions envisioned
in its template for the future - Joint Vision 2010.
One strategy to allow DoD to meet these requirements is
to seek future savings within the area of logistics.
Logistics, like DoD, is having to make innovative changes to
meet its demands. These demands can be divided into two
areas: preparations for daily operations and investing in
future modernization programs. "The end of the Cold War
requires the DoD logistics system to make adjustments to
support a smaller, highly mobile, high technology. The
pressure of fiscal limits, combined with the demands of
regional conflicts, humanitarian support, and other non-
traditional missions, all put a premium on logistics
performance and flexibility." (Kaminski, 1995, p. 2) "At
the same time, . . . 'engineering' costs out of tail" is
critically needed to invest in badly needed modernization
programs necessary to meet our natic .'s future challenges.
(Kaminski, 1995, p. 9)
How can the Department of Defense meet all of these
challenges? The solution is by using Business Process
Reengineering (BPR) and instilling the entrepreneurial
spirit to transform the excessively large and inefficient
structure of these logistics organizations into flexible,
effective, streamlined institutions capable of rapidly
adapting to the changing needs of the Armed Services. The
mechanisms for instituting these concepts are the
reinvention labs scattered throughout the Department of
Defense pursuing improved business practices.
D . METHODOLOGY
This thesis relies upon two data bases. The first was
derived from presentations by DoD Reinvention Laboratories
at the Department of Defense Reinvention Laboratory
Symposium held January 27-31, 1997, in Washington, D.C..
The second data base is a logistics-oriented Reinvention Lab
survey conducted for this thesis from May 1997 to September,
1997. Labs were asked to respond to a survey questionnaire
(see Appendix A)
,
prepared and administered for this thesis
research, to assess their performance and the DoD
reinvention waiver process.
The conference data allowed the 291 attending DoD
Reinvention Laboratory representatives to share ideas and
lessons learned and to express their concerns about
reinvention support to senior Department of Defense
officials. The conference provided a forum, via breakout
sessions, for Reinvention Laboratory personnel to ask
questions and learn how others had overcome hurdles they
faced. The symposium also provided a points of contact list
for the labs that attendees could use to further communicate
and thus better leverage group knowledge
.
A survey of the 226 Reinvention Laboratory "front-line"
points of contact provided by the Office of Performance
Improvement and Management Reengineering was then designed
and administered by the author to assess critical tools of
logistics success and to define barriers found by the
diverse Reinvention Laboratories. Based upon information
obtained from the surveys, follow-up telephone interviews or
e-mail inquiries were used to clarify responses and to
obtain amplification of data as necessary.
Literature research also was conducted to identify what
the Department of Defense's overarching logistics goals are
and how the efforts of the Reinvention Laboratories are
supporting these goals. An analysis of Vice President
Gore's National Performance Review also was undertaken to
place DoD ' s goals in perspective with the rest of the
Federal Government. An examination of the achievements as
documented from the literature review and surveys then
compared these to DoD goals.
E. THESIS OVERVIEW
Chapter II provides an analysis of how the evolving
budget and structure of the Department of Defense combined
with the nation's continuing contingency requirements has
strained its ability to maintain a high level of readiness.
Chapter II then addresses DoD ' s strategy, Joint Vision 2010,
to maintain its readiness posture in the dynamic future
while resource constrained. Chapter III starts with
answering why there is such a pressing need „ for
entrepreneurial government. It examines the origins of
reinventing government and the associated terminology
critical for understanding this reform. This chapter then
addresses the Vice President's reinvention plans using the
National Performance Review (NPR) to spearhead this wave of
change. Chapter IV shifts the reengineering/reinvention
focus directly on the Department of Defense. It
investigates what types, sizes and functional organizations
participate as Reinvention Laboratories in the DoD. It
closes with a synopsis of the objectives and the topics
covered during the 1997 Reinvention Lab Symposium. Chapter
V further refines the perspective on reinvention to
logistics. It discusses the creation of the logistics
survey and the subsequent results for the "front-line"
representatives (Appendix A)
,
where the actual innovations
are taking place. It also provides some insight from the
senior reinvention lab coordinators' perspective as recorded
from their response to a modified version of the "front-
line" representatives' survey (Appendix B) . The final
portion of the chapter provides an assessment of the lessons
learned, discusses eight reoccurring factors that lead to
success for organizations seeking innovative change, and
eight impediments planners need to address. Attached to the
eight impediments are some suggestions obtained from the
labs on how resources might be invested to enhance the
efficiency seeking efforts of the DoD Reinvention
Laboratories
.
Chapter VI provides the conclusion on how the efforts
of the laboratories have significantly contributed to not
only improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD, but
have saved significant resources badly needed for future
modernization investment . Chapter VI provides an overview of
the key leadership practices and instruments for success
documented in the analysis portion. It also restates the
potential barriers and includes a few recommendations for
where resources could be expended to enhance the reinvention
efforts by the labs. Finally, it concludes with





Care was taken to prepare an unbiased survey form.
Both positive and negative lessons learned were gathered
from the Reinvention Laboratory points of contact, without
steering them toward a particular response.
2 . Survey Data
Although the survey to the reinvention laboratory
"front-line" points of contact was sent out two times, from
May 1997 to September 1997, in an attempt to reach every
organization, we received input from only 52 of the 226
points of contact. Of these 52 responses, only 27 had
logistics or transportation reinvention input. This
illustrates the fact that there was a substantial (174
representatives that we could either not contact or did not
respond) data source that remained untapped. Data
collection was hampered by the following:
a. Utilizing Electronic Mail Vice Conventional
Mail.
While trying to conduct this research in step with
the spirit of this paper, pursuing cost effectiveness and
efficiency, the researchers elected to use e-mail to
disseminate and collect survey information. However, we ran
into problems with the e-mail addresses. Master address
lists quickly became outdated. Numerous organizations
rapidly changed their addresses as their key points of
contact, organizational titles, structures or supporting
servers changed. As a result, valuable input could not be
obtained.
b. Lack of Quantitative Data.
Due to the difficulty in quantifying savings
achieved, the newness of many of the Reinvention
Laboratories and the corresponding programs they have
started, an accurate qualitative justification of
reinvention logistics savings within the Department- of
Defense was made difficult.
c. Pinpointing Logistics Savings.
Logistics exists everywhere in almost all programs
in one shape or form. In classifying logistics reinvention,
many organizations saw logistic savings as part of some
other category. As a result, many of the innovations in
logistics reinvention and the parallel savings did not come
to light in the surveys.
d. Death by Surveys.
Most of the Reinvention Laboratories appeared to
support the logistics survey. The one constant with the
laboratories is that the people running the labs are high
spirited individuals who truly wish to make a difference.
However, it became apparent in responses to the surveys that
some of the lack of response was due to the overwhelming
requirement for information from the Reinvention
Laboratories. With many of the laboratories suffering
manpower cuts, much of this same information had been
provided already with no feedback received for their
efforts. As a result, it may be concluded that there was
little incentive perceived to justify their time re-
collecting or submitting the data.
The second chapter examines the resource
challenges faced by the Department of Defense and how DoD
plans to deal with important resource and management issues.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE MILITARY'S CHALLENGE - READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY
The Department of Defense is facing one of its most
ambitious challenges -- maintaining and supporting a highly-
capable force with a significantly reduced resource base
while continuing to meet the same, demanding operational
requirements. William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense,
emphasizes the critical nature of DoD logistics:
Maintaining the readiness and sustainability of
U.S. forces is the number one priority of the
Department of Defense. (Cohen, 1997, p. 25)
This chapter briefly outlines the past, present and
anticipated future budgetary history of the Department of
Defense and its effect on readiness. It further looks at
how the continuous use of military forces combined with the
existing level of budgetary support has strained military
readiness. Finally, the chapter will look at how the
Department of Defense will attempt to continue to meet its
vast logistical requirements in readying itself for the
future through its service- integrated template -- Joint
Vision 2010.
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1. How Have U.S. Support Requirements and
Corresponding Resource Base Evolved?
a. Past U.S. Support Requirements and Resources
The following quote summarizes the size and
corresponding resources required during the Cold War era:
During most of the Cold War years, the United
States pursued a strategy of containing the Soviet
Union. In 1985, America appropriated about $400
billion for the Department of Defense (in
constant, fiscal year 1997 dollars), which
constituted 28 percent of our national budget and
7 percent of our Gross National Product. We had
more than 2.2 million men and women under arms,
with about 500,000 overseas, 1.1 million in the
Reserve forces, and 1.1 million civilians in the
employment of the Department of Defense. Defense
companies employed 3.7 million more and about $120
billion of our budget went to procurement
contracts. (Cohen, 1997, p. 1)
b. Current U.S. Support Requirements and
Resources
The end of the Cold War has caused significant
changes in the outlook of the relative importance of the
military in comparison to other national interests. Many
critics consider the United States military too large for
the country's current needs. Their concern, given the loss
of our competitive Cold War enemy, is that the large
discretionary funding allocated to the military should be
utilized elsewhere: e.g., schools, health programs, etc.
(Federation of American Scientist Military Analysis Network
Homepage, 1995, p. 3) This concern, combined with the
current emphasis on balancing the national budget, has
caused the military budget to come under heavy scrutiny.
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The glory days of the Reagan and Bush eras are over; the
Department of Defense is not likely to see peacetime
spending of $300 billion annually again in the foreseeable
future
.
The reduced Cold War threat and the tightening of
the U.S. economic belt have significantly impacted the
defense budget and DoD structure. The reduced budget of
$250 billion is only 15 percent of the national budget and
3.2 percent of the U.S. Gross National Product. Since 1985,
the proposed "right-sizing" of the Department of Defense has
resulted in the following reductions (Table 1) to occur:
Table 1: Comparison of DoD Between 1985 and 1997
Category 1985 1997 % Reduction






$120 billion $44 billion 63%
Military
Personnel
2.2 million 1.45 million 34%
Overseas
Personnel
500, 000 200, 000 60%
Reserve Forces 1.1 million 900, 000 18%
DoD Employed
Civilians
1.1 million 800,000 27%
Defense Company
Employment
3.7 million 2 . 2 million 41%
(Cohen, 1997, p. 1)
2. Has This Drawdown Effected Readiness?
a. Past Effects
America has faced military drawdowns in the past
but, has suffered because of poor planning and execution of
these drawdowns. Painful memories of these post -drawdowns
13
of forces remain vivid to many senior military leaders.
"After both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, forces went
hollow as resources were eliminated faster than force
structure." (Cohen, 1997 p. 25) The hollowing out of the
forces was tolerated because many non-military planners felt
that a rapid build-up could be instituted in time of need.
However, contrary to many beliefs, military readiness is not
something that can be achieved instantaneously. It takes
the judicious use of resources over time to develop and
sustain ready forces. To quote one source:
It takes 20 years to develop senior military
leaders, more than 10 years to build modern
infrastructure, five to 10 to develop and field
technologically superior equipment, and one to two
years to develop a sustainment program to provide
trained and ready units. (Cohen, 1997, p. 26)
Jb. Current Effects
With the end of the Cold War, the Department of
Defense is determined not to repeat the errors of the past.
As General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, stated:
What an extraordinary success this drawdown has
been. For the first time in our history, we have
been able to reduce as significantly as we have
reduced without taking a nose-dive in readiness
.... While we are considerably smaller today than
we were when the Cold War ended, pound for pound
we are as ready today as we ever have been.
(Cohen, 1997, p. 25)
Defense analysts' views strongly differ over this
opinion. Some argue that there is growing evidence from
14
numerous sources that United States Military readiness is
not as high as heralded. The Honorable Floyd D. Spence,
Chairman of the House Committee on National Security in his
1994 review of military readiness reported:
. . . wholesale categories of combat units were
managing to preserve short term readiness only
through engaging in a desperate "shell game' with
dwindling resources. (Spence, 1997, p. 1)
In his most recent review, Chairman Spence
confirmed that the "... indicators of a long-term systematic
readiness problem are far more prevalent than they were in
1994." (Spence, 1997, p. 1) In September, 1994 Senator
John McCain (R-AZ) published a lengthy report chronicling,
on the basis of congressional testimony from members of
senior military officers, a myriad of serious deficiencies
reflecting the sharply degraded readiness and sustainability
of the nation's armed forces.
(1.) What is Causing the Strain on U.S.
Resources and Readiness? Many analysts believe that the
major cause is the continued high operational tempo for the
military to participate in missions, especially contingency
operations, "... promoting democracy abroad", and
maintaining the U.S. role as a world leader. These calls
for action continue to be answered proudly by the U.S.
military. However, with the high number of requirements
placed on the armed forces and the constraints on funding,
resources have been significantly stretched. To meet the
logistical requirements overseas in support of these
15
missions, the participating U.S. military services have had
their state-side operating and maintenance funds drastically
cut. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, for example, caused
1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Air Wing, and 1st Force
Service Support Group to shift resources until a
supplemental appropriation could be passed to compensate for
some of the resources used supporting this mission. The
Marine Corps, like the other services, had to support this
protracted humanitarian operation with internal funding
until supplemental funding was passed. Even after the
supplemental bill was passed, it did not cover all operating
costs. The Marine Corps absorbed significant portions of
these costs. Secretary of Defense Cohen illustrates the
effects on readiness of these contingency operations as
follows
:
By their very nature, contingency operations are
unforeseen. The Department [of Defense] is thus
unable to program or budget for these operations.
When the contingency occurs, the Department must
fund the operation by reallocating other funds.
Contingency costs normally occur within the
operation and maintenance appropriations and must
be absorbed unless they can be offset from
investment appropriations (procurement and
research and development) via a reprogramming
action. Since most of the military personnel and
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations,
comprising nearly 63 percent of the defense
budget, are used to support day-to-day fact-of-
life requirements and maintain high readiness
postures, investment accounts are the most likely
source of funds to be reprogrammed to support
contingency operations.
16
Another dimension of the problem with funding
contingencies is the timing of the operations; the
later an operation occurs during the fiscal year,
the less flexibility the Department has in
reprogramming . The bottom line of the funding
reality is that contingencies kill readiness. By
the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, the only
places from which funds can be diverted are the
readiness accounts that support training and
maintenance. (Cohen, 1997, p. 29)
Additionally, outside of the direct costs
associated with supporting these contingency operations are
the indirect costs accumulated with increased wear and tear
on machinery. High operational tempos prematurely age
equipment, thus causing increased operating and maintenance
costs. This fact, combined with the tightening budgetary
conditions, compounds the already stretched logistical
resources available to the military.
(2.) Will This Use of Military Resources
Change? The current high pace of operations for the Armed
Forces is expected to continue for both international and
national reasons. The 1996 National Security Strategy, A
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,
outlined that to maintain U.S.' leadership role in the
international community the U.S. Armed Forces can expect
approximately the same operational tempo in the future.
(Clinton, 1996, preface)
President Clinton has stated, "Protecting our
nation's security -- our people, our territory and our way
of life -- is my Administration's foremost mission and
congressional duty." (Clinton, 1996, p. i) Focusing on the
17
new threats and new opportunities, President Clinton's
goals, are:
• To enhance our security with military forces that
are ready to fight and with effective representation
abroad.
• To bolster America's economic revitalization.
• To promote democracy abroad. ." (Clinton, 1996, p.
i)
Most citizens agree that the first two goals
are consistent with protecting our nation's security and
support American military readiness. Some debate occurs
over the use of military resources in pursuit of
international economic status. One case in point would be
the impact of Iraq's control of Kuwait's oil fields. It has
been shown that the economic impact of this hostile action
would not truly have affected the livelihood of Americans
over the long-term as much as initially claimed. One
distinguished economist stated, "The annual cost to the U.S.
economy of doing nothing in the Persian Gulf would be at
most half of 1 percent of our gross national product, and
probably much less." (Henderson, 1990, p.l) Although
President Bush used this as a catalyst for action,
supporting democracy abroad and acting as a world leader
were more predominant reasons for American intervention in
Southwest Asia. The degree in which the U.S. pursues the
third goal of "promoting democracy abroad", however, draws
the most heated debate from individuals wishing to have a
smaller defense force and budget.
18
Although proponents acknowledge that the
United States, as a great power, possesses a special
responsibility to the world, they also point out that the
U.S. must carefully choose what missions we support.
(Isenberg, 1995, p. 2) Failure to do so will result in a
severe hampering of our ability to maintain readiness and
prepare for the future, they believe. General Colin Powell,
former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in
1992, "Although policy makers pay lip service to the reality
that the United States can no longer be the world's
policeman, U.S. actions seem to belie such statements of
restraints." Maintaining America's proud tradition as the
premier leader in world security affairs carries a high
price tag. Other critics question why the U.S. does not
pass on this responsibility and its associated costs and
allow other countries and organizations, such as the United
Nations, to shoulder them. In his National Security
Strategy, President Clinton reiterated what many advocates
have in the past proclaimed:
The United States recognizes the line between our
domestic and foreign policies is disappearing --
the boundaries between the threats that start
outside our borders and the challenges from within
are diminishing
. . . that we must revitalize our economy if we are
to sustain our military forces, foreign
initiatives and global influence, and that we must
engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign
markets and create jobs for our people.
19
. . . that our goals of enhancing our security and
bolstering our economic prosperity democracy are
mutually supporting.
... U.S. leadership and our engagement have never
been more important : if we withdraw from this
world today, our citizens will have to pay the
price of our neglect. (Clinton, 1996 preface)
.
As a world leader, the U.S. relies heavily on
the capabilities of our military forces. The threats faced
today requiring the use of the military are more diverse
than in the past. Threats challenging our security and our
international role as a leader include: spreading ethnic
conflict, rogue terrorist state violence, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and large scale environmental
degradation exacerbated by rapid population growth. All of
these threaten to undermine political stability in numerous
countries and regions.
B. HOW IS DOD GOING TO PREPARE THE MILITARY FOR FUTURE
CHALLENGES?
The United States will continue to be the international
leader and will continue to fully utilize its military. The
key question thus becomes, "How should the Department of
Defense proceed and what will be our template to success?"
Secretary Cohen answered this question in The Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
.
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The first and most visible aspects of our overall
plan to re-balance our defense programs are
necessary modest reductions in military end
strength and force structure. These reductions
are offset in part by enhanced capabilities of new
systems and streamlined support structures. The
savings that will result, combined with the
program stability we can achieve from realistic
expectations, will enable us to pay for the
transformation of our forces required by the
strategy. To preserve combat capability and
readiness, the Services have targeted the
reductions by streamlining infrastructure and
outsourcing non-military-essential functions. The
result is a balanced, flexible force that has
sufficient depth to support the strategy, that
matches structure to end strength so that
hollowness does not set in, and that will continue
to evolve toward our Joint Vision 2010
capabilities. (Cohen, 1997, p. 5)
1. The Goal of Meeting the Planned Template of Joint
Vision 2010
The successes of U.S. joint warfighting fill the pages
of history from the Revolutionary War to the present. Joint
operations, such as the invasion of Normandy, landing at
Inchon, and Desert Storm, have been pursued to "coordinate
the combat capabilities of the Services and allies or
coalition partners to achieve the greatest possible military
advantage." (Joint Doctrine Story, 1997, p. 1) Though the
U.S. military has a rich and successful history of joint
warfighting, emphasis on the formal development of joint
doctrine is relatively new. Prior to 1986, no single
individual or agency had overall responsibility for joint
doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff singularly responsible for "developing
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doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces."
("Joint Doctrine Story", 1997, p. 1) The goal of this joint
planning is to maximize the unique capabilities of each of
the Services. In effect, joint warfare allows "a
synergistic force of significantly greater joint combat
power than if each Service had been employed individually
against the same enemy". ("Joint Doctrine Story", 1997, p.
1) Although not directly stated, this "synergistic"
combination is not only the most effective but also the most
efficient in terms of resources.
Joint Vision 2010 is General John M. Shalikashvili s,
the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
"conceptual template" for how America's Armed Forces will
use resources, including the innovation of people and
leveraging of technology, to achieve new levels of
effectiveness in joint warfighting. This focused approach,
though common direction and new operational concepts applied
within a joint framework, are intended to achieve the
dominance across the range of military operations that will
allow the U.S. to meet its uncertain and challenging future.
(Shalikashvili, 1996, p. 1) Joint Vision 2010 realizes,
The American people will continue to expect us to
win in any engagement, but they will also expect
us to be more efficient in protecting lives and
resources while accomplishing the mission
successfully. (Shalikashvili, 1996, p. 8)
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This vision of future warfighting embodies the improved
capabilities available in the information age and is based
upon four operational concepts; defined as follows:
1. Dominant Maneuver The multidimensional
application of information, engagement, and mobility
capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint
air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish the assigned
operational tasks. (Shalikashvili, 1996, p. 20)
2
.
Precision Engagement - A system of systems that
enables U.S. forces to locate the objective or target,
provide responsive command and control, generate the desired
effect, assess levels of success, and retain the flexibility
to re-engage with precision when required. (Shalikashvili,
1996, p. 21)
3 Full Dimensional Protection - To control the
battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of
action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while
providing multi- layered defenses for our forces and
facilities at all levels. (Shalikashvili, 1996, p. 22)
4. Focused Logistics - Fusion of information,
logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid
crisis response, to track and shift assets even while
enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and
sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and
tactical level of operations. (Shalikashvili, 1996, p. 24)
The first three concepts rely upon the fourth concept,
"Focused Logistics", to ensure that Joint Vision 2010
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becomes a reality. America has always boasted that its
forces are the best equipped and most ready in the world.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged this
in Joint Vision 2010:
However, this quality force has been achieved only
at great expense and effort. It has required the
creation of institutions and procedures, sharpened
over more than two decades of experience, to
develop these Armed Forces in the most effective
and efficient manner possible. These institutions
and procedures, and the high quality forces they
have produced, remain at the very center of Joint
Vision 2010. (Shalikashvili , 1996, p. 6)
2. Focused Logistics
How is this "Focused Logistics" becoming an actuality?
Joint Vision 2010 states that the Department of Defense will
meet this goal by:
• "The incorporation of new information technologies
in logistics functions to transition from the rigid vertical
organizations of the past.
• Creating modular and specifically tailored combat
service support packages that evolve in response to the
wide-ranging contingency requirements.
• Service and Defense agencies will work jointly and
integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take
advantage of advanced business practices, commercial
economies, and global networks.
• Active and reserve combat service support
capabilities, prepared for complete integration into joint
operations, will provide logistic support and sustainment as
long as necessary." (Shalikashvili, 1996, p. 24)
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3 . How Will the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Logistics) Assist in Meeting Challenge
It is important to note that military planners strongly
bank on savings obtained through the increased efficiency,
effectiveness, and streamlining of the logistics
infrastructure and processes to fund critically needed
modernization of the services.
To meet the demands of U.S. objectives and the
requirements of Joint Vision 2010, Paul G. Kaminski , the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) has
developed a focused Logistics Strategic Plan. This plan
includes the following mission statement:
• To provide responsive support to ensure readiness
and sustainability for the Total Force in both peace
and war. (Kaminski, 1997, p. 4)
His vision is that the DOD Logistics System will:
• Provide reliable, flexible, cost-effective and
prompt logistics support, information, and services
to the warf ighters
;
• Achieve a lean infrastructure.
It is intended that the DOD Logistics System will meet
this vision by making selective investments in technology,
training, process reengineering (including benchmarking)
,
employing the most successful commercial and government
sources and practices.
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4. Key to Achieving Joint Vision 2010 — Business
Process Reinvention
Business Process Reengineering, through select portions
of a unit or entire organizations is one strategy being used
to allow the DOD to meet the spectrum of objectives with
fewer dollars. Business Process Reengineering (BPR)
requires the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of
business processes to bring about dramatic improvement in
performance. (Hammer, 1995, p. 24)
This concept of entrepreneurial government supports
Department of Defense Reinvention Laboratory initiatives to
assist the Department of Defense in preparing its Total
Force for the future. The next chapter will present: key
terminology, a reinvention overview, and the Clinton





This chapter will discuss the origins of reinvention
theory, key terminology, a synopsis of the accomplishments
of NPR, and a review of the types and sizes of the




1. Is There a Need for Reinvention?
The tax revolt of the early 1980s, which cut nearly one
out of every four dollars for state and local governments,
sent a strong signal to the American government that its
taxpayers would no longer support ineffective, obese
organizations providing poor service. (Osborne, 1992, p.
16) This negative sentiment was echoed in numerous surveys
conducted during the 1980s and early 1990s. The American
public's confidence in the federal government had fallen to
the lowest ever known. At the same time, the federal
deficit ballooned to $350 billion. Vice President Gore in
his introduction to From Red Tape to Results, Creating a
Government that Works Better and Costs Less, Report of the
National Performance Review, reiterated some of the more
salient negative opinions expressed by Americans across the
nation in these surveys:
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The average American believes we waste 4 8 cents of
every dollar. Five out of six want 'fundamental
change' in Washington. Only 2 percent of
Americans trust the federal government to do the
right thing most of the time -- down from 76
percent 3 years ago.
We all know why [this confidence in government is
so low] . Washington's failures are large and
obvious. For a decade, the deficit has run out of
control. . The national debt now exceeds $4
trillion -- $16,600 for every man, woman, and
child in America.
But the deficit is only the tip of the iceberg.
Below the surface, Americans believe lies enormous
unseen waste . The Defense Department owns more
than $40 billion in unnecessary supplies. The
Internal Revenue Service struggles to collect
billions in unpaid bills. A century after
industry replaced farming as America's principal
business, the Agriculture Department still
operates more than 12,000 field service offices,
an average of nearly 4 for every county in the
nation -- rural, urban, or suburban. The federal
government seems unable to abandon the obsolete.
It knows how to add, but not to subtract.
And yet, waste is not the only problem. The
federal government is not simply broke; it is
broken. Ineffective regulation of the financial
industry brought us the savings and loan debacle.
Ineffective education and training programs
jeopardize our competitive edge. Ineffective
welfare and housing programs undermine our
families and cities, (http://sunsite.unc.edu/npr/
npintro.html, 1995, p. 8)
As the Information Age pushed aside the Industrial Era,
both public and private institutions were hit hard by the
changing environment and demands of their customers. Global
economic competition, rapid simultaneous access to
information, customers lack of tolerance for poor quality or
limited options, and significantly constrained resources all
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drove the necessity for change. Institutions had to be
efficient and adaptive to survive. Private corporations
that did not adapt quickly went out of business,
-
governmental organizations, with their stable resource base,
were more fortunate. As a result, "...many American
corporations have spent the last decade making revolutionary
changes: decentralizing authority, flattening hierarchies,
focusing on quality, getting close to the their customers --
all in an effort to remain competitive in the new global
marketplace." (Osborne, 1992, p. 14) "The past decade has
witnessed profound restructuring: In the 1980s, American
corporations reinvented themselves; in the 1990s,
governments are struggling to do the same."
(http://sunsite.unc.edu/npr/npintro.html, 1995, p. 8)
From the 1930s through the 1960s, federal organizations
were built large with top-down, centralized bureaucracies.
They were patterned after the corporate
structures of the age: hierarchical
bureaucracies in which tasks were broken into
simple parts, each the responsibility of a
different layer of employees, each defined by
specific rules and regulations. With their
rigid preoccupation with standard operating
procedure, their vertical chains of command,
and their standardized services, these
bureaucracies were steady -- but slow and
cumbersome . (http: //sunsite .unc . edu/npr/
npintro.html)
These top-down bureaucracies do not work well in
today's world of rapid change, lightning-quick information




2 . Why Does the Federal Government Have a Greater
Challenge in Implementing Changing?
Individuals or groups attempting to change inefficient
federal organizations have their work cut out for them. As
Indianapolis Mayor William Hudnut best described the
challenges in a 1986 speech, "In government, the routine
tendency is to protect turf, to resist change, to build
empires, to enlarge one's sphere of control, to protect
projects and programs regardless of whether or not they are
any longer needed." (Osborne, 1992, p. 32)
Additionally, unique challenges, normally not faced by
their private counterparts, stand in the way of individuals
attempting to reinvent government. These additional
obstacles are:
a. Federal organizations are monopolies.
Federal government organizations have a captive
audience. Organizations like the Internal Revenue
Service and the air traffic control have no
competitors. Additionally, other federal organizations
have either legislative, internal regulations, or
informal policies that direct them to use other federal
organizations for support requirements, e.g. Defense
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
.
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b. Few incentives to improve, innovate or be
efficient.
The majority of governmental organizations have
limited incentive to improve. Most improvements or
innovative ideas come with a good degree of risk and
corresponding cost. Any reductions, whether in
organizational structure, manpower, or elsewhere,
resulting in savings are generally only enjoyed over
the short term (primarily the particular fiscal year)
by the implementing organization. Organizational
savings are diverted or unrealized instead of benefit
sharing with the initiating institution. Private
industry, however, can more easily shift the savings
and reinvest back their successes back into their
respective organizations. Although there are some
small monetary rewards given to successful
organizations, they generally do not offer much
compensation for all of the front-loaded or initiation
costs of implementing the change.
c. Employees have virtual lifetime tenure, regardless
of performance.
The time tested adage of once you have a
government job, you have it for life is a truism. The
existing government system makes removing substandard
performers extremely difficult. Additionally, the
effect of implementing change or restructuring the
workforce with a well establish senior hierarchy is a
more rigorous challenge.
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d. Success offers few rewards.
In the federal government, superior performance or
resourceful ideas resulting in high dollar savings, man
power reductions, or improved efficiency, by and large,
are rewarded with non-monetary awards (citations,
plaques, and etc.) . Strong incentives, like
expeditious promotions and significant cash bonuses,
are not common practice in the government. Promotion
is traditionally based on a protracted progression
based on years of service. Promotion often comes with
retirement or structure growth. In times of down-
sizing, promotion often becomes stagnant.
e
.
Federal monopolies receive their operating
money from budgets determined by Congress
without direct input from their customers .
Consequently, the organizations work to please
congressional appropriations subcommittees vice the
true customers -- the public.
f Continuous public scrutiny and political
involvement .
Most individuals or groups attempting change in
the private sector can proceed without any (or minor)
interference providing they achieve the results
expected. Federal organizations, however, almost never
have carte blanche in implementing change. Too many
stakeholders continuously fight to achieve what is best
for their interests at every turn. Additionally,
because of their high visibility and justifiable public
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interest, media interpretation of decisions or outcomes
can have dramatic effects on individual careers, agency-
development or existence. Politics and media often
blend together to intensify unsuccessful attempts at
improvement into scandalous failures.
All of these barriers add up to the American taxpayers
paying more for bloated, inefficient organizations
providing, at times, poor service. These inherent problems
with the government also increase the difficulty for those
attempting to institute positive change.
3. The Solution: Entrepreneurial Government
The pressure on federal organizations and their
responsible leaders to optimally utilize taxpayer dollars
continues to increase with the shrinking budget and steady
demands for services. As President Clinton stated in his
1993 revision of the National Performance Review report:
We can no longer afford to pay for and get less
from our government . The answer for every problem
cannot always be another program or money. It is
time to radically change the way government
operates, to shift from top-down bureaucracy to
entrepreneurial government that empowers citizens
and communities to change our country from the
bottom up. We must reward the people and ideas




//sunsite .unc . edu/npr/npintro. html, 1993
,
preface, p. 1)
"Working smarter, not harder" is not just a snappy
phrase but rather a mind set. These organizations are now
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judged on their achievements to improve the efficiency and
responsiveness to their customers.
Osborne and Gaebler in the their book, Reinventing
Government, How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming
the Public Sector, believed that government did not need to
be a excessively large and inefficient bureaucracy.
"Instead, it can govern in the true sense of the word, by
tapping the tremendous power of the entrepreneurial process
and the force of the free market." (Osborne, 1992, cover)
What is entrepreneurial government? The word entrepreneur
was coined by the French economist J.B. Say as a person who
"shifts economic resources out of an area of lower
[productivity] and into an area of higher productivity and
greater yield." (Osborne, 1992, p. xix) The authors have
created a conceptual model that encourages governmental
organizations to act like private organizations,
consistently utilizing their resources judiciously in new
ways to obtain maximum efficiency and effectiveness. In
this model ten characteristics of entrepreneurial government
are stated as follows:
1. Competing service providers between
government and business organizations.
2
.
Empowering citizens by pushing control from
bureaucracies to communities.
3. Measuring performance outcomes vice inputs.
4 Creating mission or goal driven institutions
vice rules and regulations enforcers.
5. Redefining clients as customers and offering
choices among service providers.
34
6. Preventing problems before they emerge vice
applying bureaucratic services to problems.
7. Earning money vice just spending it.
8. Decentralizing authority.
9. Choosing market mechanism over bureaucratic
mechanisms
.
10. Catalyzing public, private and voluntary
sectors into action to solve problems.
(Osborne, 1992, p. 19-20)
Recognizing the importance of utilizing this innovative
type of thinking, David Osborne was asked by the President
to act as an advisor and launch the initial training session




Before addressing the accomplishments of the National
Performance Review, it is important to define some key
terms. In studying the effects of the new public management
and the entrepreneurial spirit it is important to ensure all
personnel attempting to change their organizations use the
same jargon and possess the same mental framework. Many
people and organizations, both governmental and private,
misuse these terms. The five terms used frequently are
defined more specifically below:
1 . Restructuring
• Cut everything in the organization that
does not contribute value to the services
delivered to the customers.
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2 . Reengineering
• Start over rather than trying to "fix"
existing processes with "band aid"
solutions
.
• Think about work processes and not
functions and positions on the
organizational chart.
• Focus on improving service quality,
reduced cycle time and costs.




• Strategic planning and market research to
move the organization toward new service
delivery modes and markets.
• Reinvent the service market strategy.





• Change the organizational structure to
match the new market and service delivery
strategy.
• Move to contingency organization and
service delivery relative to new market
and service strategy and opportunities.
• Match organizational structure to strategy




• Better, faster evaluation of service
performance and quicker feedback on
improved market strategy and service
delivery.
• Think creatively about new approaches to
service delivery.
• Willingness to pilot test proposed
innovations
.
• "Quick analysis" of results for decision
making and change
.
• Sorting out real problems from symptoms
and managing people to solve real problems
quickly.
• Creating the self learning and adapting
organization. (Jones and Thompson, 1997,
p. 17)
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C. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (NPR)
1. History and Objectives of NPR
In March of 1993, President Clinton commissioned the
National Performance Review (NPR) with its purpose being
outlined as follows:
Our goal is to make the entire federal government
both less expensive and more efficient, and to
change the culture of our national bureaucracy
away from complacency and entitlement toward
initiative and empowerment. We intend to
redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire
national government. (Gore, 19 93, p.l)
President Clinton asked Vice President Gore to
spearhead this movement and figure out how to make the
government work better while costing less. The President
gave the review a six-month deadline, reporting the results
to him by September 7, 1993. In the report, Vice President
Gore concluded that the "long-term commitment to change"
answer lay in reinventing government from the ground up by:
Putting customers first.•
• Empowering public employees to acquire and manage
resources
.
• Cutting red tape.
• Using common sense.
(http
:
//sunsite . unc . edu/npr/nprintro . html , 1993
,
p. 1)
Vice President Gore's findings were presented in the
original National Performance Review report, From Red Tape
to Results issued in September 1993, and in 33 accompanying
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reports that amplify and clarify the NPR vision. Taken
together these reports total more than 1,900 pages. They
focus on changing the culture of the federal bureaucracy
(Improving Customer Service, Creating Quality Leadership and
Management, Transforming Organizational Structures, and
Streamlining Management Control) , reinventing processes and
systems {Reinventing Human Services Management, Mission-
Driven, Results -Oriented Budgeting, Improving Financial
Management, Reinventing Federal Procurement, Rethinking
Program Design, and Reengineering through Information
Technology) , restructuring relationships between the federal
government and the states and the private sector, and
individual agencies. The NPR office has also published
three yearly updates, most recently, The Best Kept Secrets
in Government, released in September, just before the last
presidential election.
2. Results and Savings from NPR
Although the actual savings from the NPR initiatives
have fallen short of the projected estimated savings (see
Table 2), the savings, nevertheless, are substantial. The
National Performance Review has suffered some criticism for
not meeting the lofty savings it has anticipated. The 1993
NPR report initially projected savings of over $2 trillion
from its initiatives. (Gore, 1993, p. 136-137) In the 1996
report, The Best Kept Secrets in Government, the Clinton
administration claimed a savings of $118 billion. A total
of 97.4 billion was directly contributed by NPR while an
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additional total of $21.5 billion in savings came from
agency actions beyond the NPR. (The Federal Communications
Commission realized an income of $20.3 billion from
auctioning wireless spectrum -- broadcast -- licenses, and
the General Services Administration restructuring of federal
construction projects saved $1.2 billion) (Gore, 1996, p.
1) The largest financial savings to date, about $16
billion, have come from the reduction of 131,000 civilian
and 223,400 military personnel from FY 1993 to FY 1995.
(Gore, 1996, p. 80) Many critics argue that they attribute
these savings largely to the ending of the cold war vice the
efforts of the NPR process. Regardless, the congressional
efforts and Clinton Administration's NPR initiatives have in
fact accelerated the timeline of the personnel reductions




Table 2. 1993 Estimated vs. Actual Savings from NPR
Recommendations (in billions of dollars)
FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 Total
1 . Streamlining the Bureaucracy Through Reengineering
Savings estimated In September 1993 report 5.0











2. Reinventing Federal Procurement
Savings estimated In September 1993 report











3. Reengineering Through Information
Technology
Savings estimated In September 1993 report
Savings based on actions to date






Savings estimated in September 1993 report











5. Changes In Individual Agencies
Savings estimated in September 1993 report
Savings based on actions to date

















Total Savings for NPR Phase 1
Savings estimated In September 1993 report
Savings based on actions to date

















CBE=Cannot be estimated at this time; estimates will be developed later.
Figures include some
Note: Details may not
FY 1994 savings,
equal totals due to rounding
.
!Gore, 1996, p. 170)
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IV. REINVENTION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The NPR has made twelve recommendations that are
specific to the Department of Defense (DOD) . These are in
addition to the Bottom up Review1 and the Acquisition Reform
Initiatives 2 :
• Rewrite Policy Directives to Include Better
Guidance and Fewer Procedures : Reduce
administrative burden and unnecessary regulatory
controls
.
Establish a Unified Budget for the DoD: Give
commanders flexibility to set priorities, solve
funding and unplanned requirements at the lowest
appropriate operational level.
Purchase Best Value Common Supplies and Services:
Buy best value supplies from public, private, or
nonprofit sources.
Outsource Non-core DoD functions: Focus on
performing core functions.
Create Incentives for DoD to Generate Business:
Allow Corps of Engineers to receive revenue for
certain commercial applications and installation
commanders generate income from solid waste
reduction and recycling. Projected savings of
$500 billion.
1 The Bottom Up Review looked at DoD force structure requirements. It
produced a total of $79 billion in budget in savings through 1997.
2 These reforms called for the use of commercial buying practices and
information technology to save money and improve product quality. They
apply to the whole of the federal governmnet and just the DoD. However,
DoD accounts for 85 percent of federal government purchases.
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• Establish a Defense Quality Workplace: Use
Quality management concepts at all levels of DoD
.
• Maximize the Efficiency of DoD Health Care
Operations: Use technology to improve care at DoD
facilities and reduce training costs. Projected
savings of $350 billion.
• Give DoD Installation Commanders More Authority
and Responsibility Over Installation Management:
Entrepreneurial management will better manage
resources and improve service to employees.
• Reduce National Guard and Reserve Costs: (1)
Limit compensation to federal employees on reserve
duty to the greater of civilian or reserve pay or
allow reservists to take annual leave. (2) Limit
housing allowance to reservists who actually bring
dependents with them on assignment when no housing
is provided. Projected savings on $900 billion.
• Streamline and Reorganize the US Army Corps of
Engineers: Implement 1992 proposal to reduce from
eleven to six division offices and offer
engineering and technical expertise to other
agencies. Projected savings of $68 billion.
The success of these and other NPR initiatives is
especially important because Congress and the Clinton
Administration are relying on the savings they produce to
cut defense budgets without impairing the capability of the
armed forces to carry out their assigned missions. It would
be a serious blow if these savings failed to materialize.
Because reducing overheads is in several instances the key
to these savings, it is somewhat disturbing that reductions
in overheads have to date lagged reductions in force
structure
.
A. BACKGROUND ON REINVENTION IN THE DOD
The DoD has accomplished major changes in response to
the NPR and on its own initiative across programs,
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functional areas, and organizational units. Innovations in
procurement, financial management, personnel, privatization,
and logistics have been implemented. DoD has earned over 75
Hammer Awards awarded by the NPR to recognize organizations
that have made exemplary improvements. (Gore, 1996, p. 223)
The "$6.00 hammer with a little red, white, and blue ribbon
is the Vice President's symbolic answer to the $400.00
hammer of yesterday's government". (Gore, 1996, p. 223)
DoD has also received 10 Presidential Quality Awards
and Quality Improvement Prototype Awards. (DoD, 1996, p.
iii) In 1996, DoD was awarded the only Presidential Quality
Award in the federal government for Army Research,
Development and Engineering Center in Picatinny Arsenal, New
Jersey. (DoD, 1996, p. iii) The Center designed lethal
tank- fired munitions and reduced training costs, energy
expenditures, hazardous wastes storage and overhead costs.
DoD won an additional seven of the nine Quality Improvement
Prototype Awards presented in 1996. (DoD, 1996, p. iv)
Winners included the Defense Mapping Agency for reducing
management layers from 11 to 3; the Naval Station, Mayport
,
for reducing initial check- in-stations from 24 to 8; and the
Army's Communication Electronics Command Logistics and
Readiness Center for reducing acquisition lead times 25
percent and back orders almost 50 percent. Finally, the
Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) became the government's
first Performance Based Organization (PBO) in October 1996.
(DoD, 1996, p. iv) PBO ' s are business- type operations that
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are given great autonomy and flexibility to manage their
operations. In addition to relief from Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) , General Services Administration (GSA) , and
DoD rules, PBOs can hire a chief executive under a
performance contract for a fixed term and pay higher
salaries and bonuses than most government organizations.
These are just a few examples that demonstrate DoD
commitment to the goals of NPR.
B. REINVENTION LABS
To a remarkable degree, the reinvention movement relies
on the initiative of front-line employees. The bottom-up
part of the reinvention effort is concentrated in
approximately 3 00 Reinvention Laboratories throughout the
federal government that are located in DoD. These labs are
working on all kinds of innovation: reengineering around
information technology, empowering employees and customers,
using the private sector to achieve public purposes,
promoting internal and external competition, taking new
approaches to internal management -- delegation of authority
to staff, continuous improvement, Total Quality Management
(TQM), self-managed teams, participatory management, greater
reliance on incentives, flatter organizations, cross-
training, and geographic decentralization -- all with the
objective of improved consumer service and enhanced mission
performance at a lower cost
.
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1. Number and Size of DoD Reinvention Laboratories
DoD labs range in scale and scope from small single
function offices located at a single site to large and
complex multi-functional, multi-site organizations, such as
the Army Forces Command (see Table 3) . Based on the 88 (of
approximately 12 0) Reinvention Laboratories in the DoD that
responded to a survey conducted in 1996 by the Office of
Performance Improvement and Management Reengineering within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller,
DoD Reinvention Laboratories come in all sizes.
Most multi-facility/multi-installation Reinvention
Laboratories were designated as large scale labs; those
which comprised a single facility or installation were
counted as medium; those which comprised only a portion of
single facility were counted as small,
(http
:
//www. dtic . dla.mil/npr/lab_initiatives . html)
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Table 3 . DoD Reinvention Laboratories
Air Force 7 3
Army 22 11
Navy- 14 3
Marine Corps 12 2
Central Imagery- Off ice 1
Defense Finance & 4








Defense Investigating 10 1
Service
Defense Logistics Agency 18 6 12
National Security Agency 6 6
DoD Science & ,
Technology Labs 3 2 10
Totals 88 27 32 29
a. Joint DLA and DCAA "Reducing Overnight Costs" Reinvention Laboratory
is included in DLA total
.
b. Included 26 individual sites (1 DoD, 5 USAF, 15 USA, and 5 USN)
.
(Gosnell, 1997, p. 48)
2. Functional Classification of DoD Reinvention
Laboratories
Again, according to the Office of Performance
Improvement and Management Reengineering survey, Reinvention
Laboratories perform a variety of support and training
functions (see Table 4)) . The greatest number of
Reinvention Laboratories is in the Administrative Support
area. This group includes 34 laboratories or 40 percent of
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the total. . Next come logistics organizations with 21
laboratories (24 percent)
.
Table 4 . DoD Reinvention Laboratories by Functional
Classifications















HUMAN RESOURCES 7 5 1 1
EDUCATION Sc 5 2 2 1
TRAINING
ADMINISTRATIVE 34 6 2 6 9 2 9
SUPPORT
Total 88 7 14 12 18 15 22
(Gosnell, 1997, p. 49)
Note 1: The other group includes all of the smaller DoD agencies and
organizations
.
3. Progress of DoD Reinvention Laboratories
By definition, a reinvention lab is place where
experimentation takes place, where new practices, processes,
and procedures are tried. Based upon self reports, some DoD
Reinvention Laboratories have been able to do more than
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others (see Table 5) . About 40 percent believe they have
been able to make significant changes in the way they do
business; another 20 percent believe they have made some
changes; the rest report that they have not done much.
Table 5. Reinvention Laboratories Level of Innovation












DoD SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LABS
7 1 3 3
22 11 3 8
14 8 5 1







Totals 88 34 18 36
(Gosnell, 1997, p. 51)
For the most part, these self -assessments closely track
the reported accomplishments of the individual labs. All of
those reporting significant progress also claimed measurable
performance improvements; most of those reporting some
progress could point to a well formulated plan of action and
in many cases initial positive results from their efforts.
Not surprisingly, the entities within the DoD that tend to
encourage innovation (see Table 6) have the highest propor-
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tion of labs reporting some or significant levels of
innovation.
Table 6 . DoD Reinvention Successes and Labs by Parent Organization















DEFENSE ADVANCED PROJECTS AGENCY
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
DOD SCIENCE Sc TECHNOLOGY LABS
TOTALS 88 225
Table 6 cross-tabulates the 225 reinvention successes
reported in the September 1996 report, Reinventing the
Department of defense (DoD, 1996) , and the 88 DoD
reinvention labs by parent organization.
Table 6 makes it abundantly clear that a lot of
reinvention has taken place in the DoD outside of formally
designated reinvention labs. TQM is one example. All Air


















self assessments for the Inspector General. The criteria
have seven main categories: leadership, information and
analysis, strategic planning, human resource development and
management process management, business results, and
customer focus and satisfaction. TQM training and awareness
is now part of all Air Force education courses from basic
training through the Air War College. The DLA commitment to
TQM may exceed even that of the Air Force
.
Nevertheless, although reinvention successes have been
identified at many organizations that are not formally
designated Reinvention Laboratories, the labs play a
distinctive role in the reinvention effort. Reinvention
Laboratories are the chief means by which a new management
culture can be inculcated in agencies that have been slow to
embrace wholesale managerial change. Those who succeed can
then be promoted, made "heroes" and coaches. Others can be
given time to readjust, and roadblockers must, of course,
eventually be removed if reinvention is to succeed
throughout government. From this standpoint, waivers
granting the labs freedom from administrative rules and
regulations may be seen as the lifeblood of reinvention.
DoD has a policy, set by Secretary Perry's Memo dated
28 March 1994, of being committed to granting well- justified
requests for waivers that are consistent with the law.
However, waivers have not been granted on a broad scale. It
is very hard for bureaucratic organizations to motivate and
sustain change. Traditions, procedures, and policies
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militate against change and create an impression of
intransigence even where top management is supportive.
4. The 1997 Reinvention Laboratories Symposium
The DoD Reinvention Labs Symposium took place January
27-31 at the Holiday Inn Westpark in Rosslyn, Virginia. The
session on Monday the 27 was primarily introductory and
featured presentations by the NPR's John Kamensky and
Jeffrey Goldstein. The Tuesday session focused on Logistics
Reinvention, with breakout sessions dedicated to multi-
functional teaming, improving customer service, and
reinventing service delivery. The Wednesday session focused
on Contract/Acquisition Reinvention, with breakout sessions
dedicated to commodity purchases, process reforms, and
administering contracts. The Thursday session focused on
Human Resources Reinvention, with breakout sessions
dedicated to DoD Science and Technology Laboratories
Personnel Demonstration Project, professional development
improving personnel services to customers, and employee
empowerment. The session on Friday featured an overview of
the DoD accounting and financial management strategy from
the standpoint of DFAS and discussions of using the Internet
as a business process reengineering toolkit and how to set
up a decision process for waivers.
The purpose of the 1997 DoD Reinvention Laboratories
Symposium, sponsored by the Office of Performance
Improvement and Management Reengineering within the Office
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of the Undersecretary of Defense, Comptroller, was to share
successes and failures, as well as to clear the air and
improve the waiver process. The expressed objectives of the
symposium included (Foster, 1997, pp. 1-2):
• Providing an opportunity for DoD Reinvention
Laboratories to meet and exchange ideas about
reinvention
.
• Providing a forum for the transfer of knowledge
and experience from successful labs to all DoD
labs .
• Providing Reinvention Laboratories with the DoD
corporate vision, strategy, and objectives in
logistics, contracts/acquisition, human resources,
and financial management.
Participating Reinvention Laboratories were asked to focus
on process improvement questions such as (Foster, 1997, p.
3) :
• What has been done to date?
• What has worked and what has not worked?
• What waivers have been requested?
• What waivers have been granted and which have been
denied?
• What performance measures have been used?
• How can processes be improved?
The Office of Performance Improvement and Management
Reengineering is the designated coordinator for the
Department of Defense. A detailed list of all senior
National Performance Review Department of Defense points of
contact can be obtained from the DoD Reinvention Lab website
at http://www.dtic.dla.mil/npr/nprpocs.html. In Chapter V,
data from the following five major organizations and
respective senior lab representatives (see Table 7) will be
52
used for the trend analysis of success and barriers to
success within the Department of Defense:
Table 7 . DoD Reinvention Senior Lab Representatives







Diane Farhat (labs & waivers)
Steve Eisenberg (SecNav/MC)
Manuel Pablo (labs & waivers)
Lt. Col. Rob McDaniel







Chapter IV provided the background material on what the
National Performance Review, via the efforts of the
Reinvention Laboratories, is attempting to accomplish by-
instilling the entrepreneurial spirit, tapping the free
market and benchmarking private industries ' successes
.
Chapter V provides a brief background on the second of the
two major forums (1997 Reinvention Lab Symposium and the
Annual Logistic Business Reengineering Conference) used to
aggressively implement logistics change. Chapter V then
provides an analysis of the logistics survey data collected
from "front-line" representatives to define the positive or
negative trends faced by the Reinvention Laboratories. The
chapter also analyzes and documents the trends that top
level coordinators found in their service or agency's
reinvention program and the subsequent lessons they have
learned. It provides examples of success stories to be used
as benchmarks as well as documents obstacles faced in
attempting to change their organizations. In identifying
both successful and unsuccessful initiatives, this thesis
does not offer an independent assessment of self -reported
accomplishments. Finally, Chapter V examines the specific
accomplishments and savings of DoD Reinvention Laboratories
in pursuit of Logistics initiatives and the necessary
changes in rules, processes, and attitudes needed for DoD
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Reinvention Laboratories to improve upon their current
successes
.
A. MEETING THE NEED FOR LOGISTICS REINVENTION
Department of Defense officials are placing immense
emphasis on the need for reengineering and reinvention of
logistics management. In addition to the DoD 1997
Reinvention Lab Symposium, an annual logistics business
reengineering conference, sponsored by the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Logistics) in conjunction with the
Naval Postgraduate School, has recently become instituted to
gather the best and brightest industry and DoD
representatives to share ideas. The 1996 meeting, held at
the Hyatt Regency Monterey, California (adjacent to the
Naval Postgraduate School) 28 April 1996 to 1 May, 1996
consisted of a three-day conference. The conference theme,
articulated by John F. Phillips, the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Logistics) , and David R. Whipple, Associate
Provost for Innovation Director, IDEA, Naval Postgraduate
School, was "Strategies for Success Into the Next Century".
It focused on, "... today's efforts to bring logistics
support into the future through modernized information
systems and applications of lessons learned from industry."
Presentations included status updates of the Department's
transportation and medical logistics, and parallel industry
automation efforts. Other topics included Continuous
Acquisition and Life Cycle Support (CALS) business
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strategies and TAV efforts in Bosnia. Similar to the
Reinvention Symposium, the Logistics Conference provided an
open forum for sharing the Department's effort to streamline
the logistics infrastructure, reduce logistics response
times, and to gain Industry's perspective.
To illustrate the importance and impact of logistics
management within DoD, an entire day (day two of five) of
the 1997 Reinvention Symposium was devoted to improving this
area. The first speaker, Roy Willis, Principal Assistant
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) opened with a
presentation titled "Logistics Management - DoD Vision."
With this presentation he set the stage with what DoD
currently is facing and briefly described a few of the
general ways logistics impediments will be managed. Willis
began his presentation with the topic "Reinventing Logistics
Engineering in the 21st Century". Projecting the future of
the Defense and Logistics Budget, he observed that
Department of Defense Logistics will be going through some
substantial changes in the 21st Century. The DoD budget of
approximately $250 billion that ensures force readiness,
modernization, quality of life and procurement of needed
equipment will be reduced. A reduction of an estimated $69




• Procurement (most drastic of cuts)
• Operations and Maintenance
Willis indicated the nature of the budget squeeze in
O&M using logistics support data, e.g., type of equipment
and the associated maintenance costs acceleration that is
most pronounced for older equipment in their required
protracted life cycle. For example, by the year 2010 the F-
14 tactical aircraft will be 41 years old, the CH-47
helicopter will be 71 years old. By 2040 the B-52 bomber
aircraft will be 94 years old and the KC-130 cargo aircraft
will be 86 years old. The increased length of service
causes higher operating costs due to equipment fatigue and
the resulting requirement for increased maintenance actions.
These costs continue to rise making it an uphill battle to
support this aging and often less effective equipment. This
fact, combined with the reality that new procurement and
upgrading of existing equipment is currently too slow,
means that the services may not be prepared for their
missions in the future. For example, DoD currently is
slated only to upgrade 3,000 of 14,000 tanks and Infantry
Fighting Vehicles (IFV - Bradley) by 2010. "These problems
alone indicate why we have to reengineer logistics," stated
Willis.
According to Willis, reengineering in logistics will
focus on research and development, moving to what is termed
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open systems architecture. This concept of open systems
architecture relies on incorporating long range planning
into the construction of equipment and software so that new
systems and components can be plugged in to upgrade
equipment over its life time. Increased contractor
logistics support, embedded training and advanced self-
diagnostics also will contribute to reengineering.
Equipment will be developed and installed to avoid the need
for existing or increased maintenance personnel and to
decrease down time. Application of new methods will be
crucial in this effort.
Real time logistics control versus cumbersome long-term
planning is an essential goal to be achieved. This requires
new forms of control, planning, execution, monitoring, and
replanning. Willis explained that "Ensuring the right
amount, at the right time, right place, with the right
stuff" requires a tremendous amount of support for the DoD
force structure
.
He then provided a second example that further
amplified why logistics needs to make such a significant
improvement in its business practices. Willis stated that
in 1995 there were approximately 800,000 enlisted mechanics,
and roughly 100,000 personnel in supply and acquisition
related jobs. He provided the following statistics:
• 1 out of 3 enlisted personnel are mechanics,
• Mechanics average 2-3.5 hours of actual hands-on
time due to other prerequisites (MOS proficiency,
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rifle range, and other necessary training
requirements)
,
• Due to this fact and other factors the cost to the
government is approximately $250.00/hr.
Willis noted the great need to simplify the logistics
information systems. Currently, in DoD there are 6.3
million catalogue items, 2.2 billion logistics
transactions/year, $44 billion in wholesale logistics
business conducted, and over 1000 stock locations. These
stock locations only include the depots and supply
installations only; not operational units. Better
information systems are needed to improve transaction
accounting from coding inputs to analysis of performance and
outputs
.
The procurement process also needs revision. Currently,
procurement procedures are the same for all items ( i.e.,
all are purchased for the long term even though some items
may be consumed in one year or less and are small purchases
relative to buying an aircraft or ship) . Information
technology is procured in the same manner. This is a major
problem in that much hardware and software technology turns
over every 18-20 months. Willis concluded that joint total
asset visibility is desperately needed in logistics.
Without this, many other processes cannot be reengineered.
"If we do not do this then our logistics system will operate
as if we are looking through soda straws." (Willis, 1997)
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In the following sections, this thesis analyzes how
reengineering and reinventing are intended to improve some
of the weaknesses the Principal Assistant Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Logistics) saw in procurement, by
meeting logistical support requirements rapidly and by
instituting programs permitting DoD to shift money towards
modernization programs.
B. LOGISTICS REINVENTION LAB SURVEY
1. Design of the Survey
In May, 1997, a survey (Appendix 1) was created by the
researchers to obtain data from the front-line Reinvention
Laboratories, conducting logistics initiatives, on both the
reinvention and waiver processes. These two important areas
of study were broken out to best analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of the individual areas of research. There were
numerous concerns in conducting the survey. The following
paragraphs provide some of the concerns and what was done to
overcome them.
a. Preventing Bias Wording of the Survey
When creating the survey, we attempted to word the
questions in a manner that would not bias the answers
provided by the Reinvention Laboratory representatives. The
survey attempted to obtain both the positive and negative
aspects the logistics and transportation reinvention
laboratories met in pursuit of their attempts to institute
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change. Some individuals might feel the survey looked for
flaws vice positive results based on the wording. That is
understandable. However, since the goals of this thesis as
addressed in Chapter 1 were to:
• Analyze key aspects of success stories so that
others may benchmark them.
• Determine any impediment trends to successful
research efforts so that recommendations could be
documented and forwarded to the Office of
Performance Improvements and Management
Reengineering, the Department of Defense
Comptroller
.
the researchers felt that the questions had to be
constructed accordingly to obtain the required data.
Jb. Attempting to Keep Survey Brief
In attempting to obtain maximum response while
minimizing the burden on the Reinvention Laboratories, the
researchers sought to keep the survey as brief as possible.
Whenever possible, the reinvention laboratories were asked
to use already prepared information to amplify remarks. The
objective of the survey was to obtain solid quantitative and
qualitative data, yet, not have the labs recreate material
already on hand.
c. Utilization of Likert Scale
A "Likert" scale was used for two of the eleven
questions (question 5 - barriers to reinvention efforts and
question 8 - barriers to waiver process) . This assessment
method not only provided quantitative data that could be
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used for trend analysis but expedited the recipient
s
answering of the survey form.
For questions 5 and 8, a scale from 1 to 5, in
increments of one, was used to allow the laboratory
representatives to provide their estimation of how a
particular category impeded either an aspect of the
reinvention or waiver process. A "5" representing the
greatest problem and a "1" the least problem.
d. Measures
The survey was tested for validity by first having
five students with no knowledge of reinvention review the
survey to judge whether it was understandable, direct,
concise, and whether the questions were biased. From their
comments, modifications were implemented. The revised
survey questionnaire was then resubmitted to these same five
students for additional comments. From this review, further
modifications were made. The third step was to submit the
survey to three individuals intimate with the reinvention
and waiver processes. Revisions were made based on feedback
from these three personnel and a revised copy was
resubmitted to the three knowledgeable reinvention personnel
for a critique. After the fourth review, the survey was
submitted to the 226 Reinvention Laboratories points-of-
contact currently on the reinvention master list provided by




(1.) Sampling Procedure. Due to the lower
than expected survey response, (received 52 responses from
the 226 possible reinvention lab points of contact -- of
which only 27 were laboratories currently implementing
waivers in areas associated with logistics or
transportation) sampling was not done. Instead, all
responses from the population were used.
(2.) Data Collection. Due to the lower than
expected return from the first submission of the survey to
the Reinvention Laboratories, a second submission of the
survey was conducted. Follow-up phone and e-mail interviews
were additionally done to obtain a greater return rate and
further amplification of survey responses.
Confidentiality is another important aspect.
In collecting the qualitative and quantitative data, the
researchers assured the reinvention labs' representatives
complete confidentiality on any information provided.
Personal or organizational names are identified only for
assigning credit for positive suggestions or achievements.
2. Results of the "Front-Line" Survey
The replies to the survey provided substantial insight
into the successes and impediments to logistics reinvention.
It also provided trend analysis on questions #5 - Ranking of
Barriers to Reinvention and #8 - Ranking of Barrier to
Waiver Process which used the Likert scale. This section
summarizes the trends noted.
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a. Qualitative Reporting
(1.) Positive Trends. Six positive trends
were identified from the survey responses. They are as
follows
:
• All Labs Have Made Some Level of
Change
All labs reported that to some degree,
they were able to make some change within their
organization. The majority of organizations made it clear
that being a reinvention lab offered greater flexibility and
important visibility. Additionally, many representatives
conveyed that the lab designation allowed them greater
latitude in pursuing what was best for their organization.
They also conveyed that it often allowed them the ability to
experiment where they might not otherwise have had the
opportunity to do so. However, many of the labs also echoed
the comment that being a lab offers great opportunity, but
it was not the "be all to end all". It did not guarantee
success. Simply doing good business for your customers in
a smart, effective manner, ensuring that all steps add value
is the key outcome. What is more important is instituting a
mindset of constantly looking for ways to be more efficient
or effective. The Air Force has attempted to incorporate
this mindset service-wide in their continuous improvement




The single most impressive trend noted
by the labs was an overwhelming "can do" attitude and
genuine enthusiasm of the "change agents" in doing their job
well. Many of these labs face numerous hurdles to succeed
such as lack of up-front funding, cultural resistance,
limited manpower, "turf or rice bowl battles" -- to name a
few, yet continued to exude a tireless desire to improve
their organization. Professors Fred Thompson, Willamette
University, and Lawrence Jones, the Naval Postgraduate
School, analysts of the reinvention processes, sum up the
success of the reinvention laboratories in their article
"Unsung Heroes". In this article, they attribute the
immense success and documented monetary savings in resources
within the Department of Defense to the innovation and drive
of the front-line workers who spearhead the daily battles.
This quote illustrates the unselfish nature of the
Reinvention Lab front-line worker:
. . .
[instituting Reinvention is] like any
worthwhile effort that takes effort, time and
money. It's as difficult as changing culture
through TQM. It takes time and persistence, but
it's worth it. Do not expect to be recognized --
often as not, someone else will get credit for
your work. You have to believe the old saying
that "he who cares too much about who gets the
credit, never gets anything done".
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• Supportive Senior Leaders
Many organizations throughout all of the
major components and Department of Defense agencies
indicated that a major factor in the success of their
reinvention and reengineering efforts were due to active
"champions". These senior individuals at all levels pushed
support and often provided needed resources to worthy-
initiatives and processes. Additionally, they fought
cultural friction and naysayers to eventually enable the
innovative ideas to be implemented.
• Organizational Sharing of Ideas and
Pre-established Waivers
Many organizations within DoD are
transferring lessons learned internally. Two organizations
have showed the most promising display of sharing success
stories. The Army's FORSCOM and TRADOC, in particular, and
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have multiple cases where
other internal organizations "piggy-backed" on sister agency
success. The survey responses showed that within these
organizations there has been effort to "push" information
learned and to fully utilize the capabilities developed.
• "In Step" with DoD Vision
Many organizations show that they
clearly understand the DoD reinvention vision. The majority
of labs in their responses showed, as stated by Rachel
Kopperman-Foster at the 1997 DoD Reinvention Lab Symposium,
"that being a reinvention lab was more than simply pursuing
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waivers; it was reinventing their organization to function
more efficiently and effectively." Again, numerous
representatives in every service and governmental agencies
reported improving their organizations without the need of
rules waivers by simply "doing business smarter" .
• Local Incentive Programs
The Army's Training and Doctrine
(TRADOC) Command showed that they are one of DoD's premier
innovators. James R. Freeman reported how TRADOC had
instituted two programs to work around the lack of resources
issue. To quote:
Two of the Reinvention Laboratories have created
incentive programs in the way of offering monetary
support to innovative, bold thinking. The Mission
Support Laboratory created the Base Operations
Opportunity Leveraging and Developments (BOLD)
Grants initiative which provides seed money to
installations to test innovations to make BASOPS
[base operations] more effective, efficient, and
customer focused. This program has been
recognized by the National Performance Review
(NPR) by award of the Hammer Award. Secondly, the
Training Laboratory created the Breakthrough
Special Monetary Account for Reinventing Training
(B-SMART) , which provides venture capital for
reinvention initiatives as well as awards for
organizations making submissions. (Freeman, 1997)
(2.) Negative Trends. The surveys reported
seven negative trends. They are as follows:
• "Broken" Waiver Process
The number one comment in the survey
focused on the Department of Defense's inability to provide
timely final approval or disapproval of waivers. Many
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Reinvention Laboratory representatives felt that the current
waiver process is broken. They provided a multitude of
examples where 90 - 180 plus days were spent awaiting the
outcome of their waiver requests. To illustrate the overall
sense of frustration associated with the waiver process a
few eye-catching reinvention lab quotes may be cited:
I have seen the enemy . . . and the enemy is us.
We need to reinvent the [reinvention] waiver
process
We have a general comment regarding the current
waiver process. It violates the original guidance
from then Secretary [of Defense] Perry empowering
a Reinvention Lab commander to approve DoD waivers
and to implement them if the DoD Chief Counsel
could not determine within 3 days that the waiver
violated a federal statute. The current process
also violates the guidance given by Vice President
Gore in the Blair House Papers: "Don't decide
anything in headquarters that can be decided
someplace else." ... The current DoD process is no
better than the waiver process BEFORE Reinvention.
Our last two DoD- level waivers were "disapproved'
by DoD. The lesson learned by many labs was that
we no longer had the authority given to us by
Secretary Perry to waive any DoD- level
regulations, so we stopped wasting our time.
The waiver process has become too complicated. In
these time of "Do more with less", if the process
is too complicated it won't get done.
The revised DoD waiver process of 2 April [97] did
not improve the waiver process because we still




Lack of immediate results have caused many
[fellow] labs to lose enthusiasm and quit
submitting waivers requiring DoD approval.
The DoD waiver process is quite slow and
burdensome
.
• No Single Point of Contact, No
Single Set of Waiver Requirements
The second most common impediment
documented in the surveys was the frustration of having to
deal with multiple points of contact and multiple waiver
requirements. The representatives stated that each level
had its own requirements which impeded progress. To
illustrate the following comments are included:
Establish a single POC and provide sufficient
personnel resources for the POC to be effective.
The Reinvention Process should not be put under a
directorate or division. The success of this
program relies on the ability to task directors
and subordinates without the traditional layers
and processes . . . (layer after layer) . The "stove
pipe" [structure] slows down the process and, in
some instances, stops good changes from occurring.
Suggest the program be placed under the chief of
staff or equivalent level throughout the DoD.
The reinvention waiver process needs to get back
to the philosophy and spirit of Secretary William
Perry's 23 May 1995 memorandum. Waiver Authority
for Reinvention Laboratories and Centers, which
prescribes delegation of authority to waive
requirements at the DoD level to reinvention labs,
omitting the need for significant additions to the
approval cycle by functional points of contact.
This excess review creates an atmosphere of
"protecting the rice bowls" of authority, and
negatively affects reinventive thinking.
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• Waivers Used for Personal
Agendas
Another common theme documented in the
survey responses was, as one lab representative put it,
"senior officials using the waiver process to push personal
agendas". The quotes below, taken from the Reinvention Lab
representatives reply to "the describe your most serious
impediments" question, illustrate this effect:
"Not invented Here", incredible resistance to
change, no matter who is behind the initiative.
Old timers have long ago determined that they can
wait out everything they disagree with ....
. . . waiving regulations has become encumbered by
the bureaucracy. For example we have the
authority to directly waive (service) regulations,
and have been successful in doing so. On the
other hand, waiving DoD regulations is restricted
to approval [by DoD only currently and which is]
difficult to work. This slows down the process
and has proven to be much more difficult to work.
In both cases, the stovepipes don't get it. They
have a tendency to want to protect their own turf
and do not want to work horizontally to make
process change. . .
.
Traditional management styles [exist] , overly
negative counterparts in other commands impede
progress ....
The most serious impediment to reinvention
improvement is the unwillingness of functional
areas within the organizations under the Lab's
cognizance to accept changes to their areas.
• Fast Rotation of Key Leaders
Many reinvention laboratories stated
that the short rotation of key senior leaders impeded
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potential reinvention progress. As documented it affected




One course of action taken by new
leaders joining a reinvention lab was either to
permanently stop the entire initiative or bring it to a
halt while they decided how they wanted to proceed.
The labs stated, at both the reinvention symposium and
during phone and e-mail interviews, that for one reason
or another, new senior leaders personally disagreed
with the reinvention initiative (s) already instituted
by their predecessors and chose to stop or go in a
different direction with the initiatives.
Different Leaders Wish to
Make Their Own Unique Mark
Different leaders typically
institute their own, unique vision with their organizations
and, consequently, drop previous reinvention work in
process. The reinvention labs have conveyed that this sets
back progress made and can often stop the entire process.
The long initiation process is an uphill battle most labs
prefer to face only once, let alone twice. Meeting such




It Takes Time to Brine? a
New Leader Up-To-Speed
The problem with the changing of
the guard is that the new leader must be brought up-to-speed
on all of the nuances of the Reinvention Process and to push
for successful waivers. This third course of action, which
is significantly less of an impediment to reinvention
efforts, set back the rate in which waivers could be
requested or implemented.
• Lack of Quantifiable
Performance Measures /Cost
Savings
The survey responses indicated that
numerous labs clearly have solid measures of performance
established and provided data on cost, manpower, and other
resource savings. However, many other laboratories had no
data. These labs did not have well established metrics to
enable them to measure their performance.
• Lack of Up-To-Date Databases
While some organizations were able to
"piggy-back" or benchmark already instituted waivers for the
benefit of their organization, this was not a common case.
A DoD NPR waiver database has been established
(http
:
//www. dtic .mil/npr/newwave . html or
http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/npr.newwave.html) . However,
many laboratories complained about it being "woefully" out-
of-date. The reinvention laboratories felt, as a result,
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that it impeded their efforts in two ways. First, many labs
could not verify the true status of the waivers they
submitted. This caused extra time to be exerted in the
repeated tracking of the current progress or standing of
their waivers. Secondly, many logistics reinvention lab
representatives felt that the lack of an up-to-date waiver
database prevented them from adequately "piggy-backing"
other similar organizations' waiver successes or using it to
gauge their shortfalls. The labs indicated that this
extremely valuable mechanism could not be fully exploited.
• Untouchable Waiver Areas
Several labs expressed continued
frustration with being unable to institute change in two
areas deemed important but restricted from change. The
following comments were provided:
The real places where waivers could be of vital
use are in the area of personnel and fiscal
management and these areas are effectively off
limits
.
It appears that some areas have been excluded from




Process improvement with personnel
issues was also a hot topic of debate at the 1997
Reinvention Symposium. Many attendees expressed frustration
with regard to personnel programs, in particular the
Priority Placement Program (PPP) . Diane Disney, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy
was very adamant about the support her office would give to
anyone aggressively pursuing innovative ideas in the area of
the personnel system infrastructure. However, she also made
it very clear that all demonstration projects had to uphold
the merits of Equal Pay, Equal Opportunity, and could not be
exempted from prohibited personnel rules. (Disney, 1997)
jb. Quantitative Reporting
The analysis of the quantitative section of the
survey, questions #5 and #8, provides some additional trend
information. For each of these questions a table and graph
of results is provided to illustrate the resulting outcomes.
Two important notes must be interjected. First, although 27
logistics surveys were obtained, not every lab that answered
rated every question. Some lab representatives indicated
that certain categories were "not applicable" and marked
them accordingly. As a result the sample size for each
category varied. Sample sizes used for calculations are
identified with each table. The second note is that the
data shows trends, but not as significantly as anticipated.
This was caused by two primary factors:
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• The scope of the survey (logistics and
transportation oriented) significantly narrowed
the ability to capture a large sample size.
• The respective size and mission of the activity
greatly affected the final results of the data.
To illustrate, most small laboratories had minimal
dealings with DoD. This fact, therefore, tended
to skew the results. For future surveys, it is
recommended that the size of the organization and
to whom they report needs to be considered to more
accurately conduct trend analysis.
(1.) Ranking of "Disincentives to
Reinvention" (Survey Question #5) . Question 5 asked the
labs to rank the "Barriers to Reinvention": up front costs,
anticipated funds lost, loss of jobs, absence of resources,
and generalized resistance to change. Table 8 provides
means based on the rankings the laboratory representatives
assigned to these listed disincentives.
Table 8. Logistic Labs 1 Disincentives to
Reinvention - Mean Values of Input (1-5 Scale)
UP FRONT ANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED ABSENCE OF GENERALIZED
COSTS LOSS OF FUNDS LOSS OF JOBS RESOURCES RESISTANCE
TO CHANGE
(N=19) (N=15) (N=16) (N=20) (N=20)
2.21 2.6 2.625 3 .35 3.6
(Jenkins, 1997)
The number one disincentive to labs was
Generalized Resistance to Change (see Table 9 and Graph #1)
.
Changing "established mind-sets" was cited by 65% of the
survey respondents as a major impediment in the labs' effort
to change their organizations.
Absence of resources was ranked second.
Manpower availability to institute and see these changes
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through was cited as a major variable. Comments provided by
the laboratory representatives are listed below to
illustrate this point:
...They [leadership] must allow people to put in
the time needed to develop waiver ideas, develop
paperwork and new processes, etc. This time
should not be seen as a burden or an additional
duty . . . When organizations are downsizing and
staff are doing more with less, it is hard to get
people motivated to do everything and the
paperwork to submit a waiver, besides keep all
sorts of detailed implementation costs data that
my be more costly to measure ....
. . . the (name withheld) organization is disrupted
by the regionalization of Human Resources
functions and large scale automation efforts such
as those required to implement (program) as
mandated. The impact of these changes has created
an environment where people at all levels of the
organization find it difficult to keep pace with
changes over which they have limited control. In
this type of environment, management attention to
reinvention lab waivers is of secondary
importance. Employees, trying to do more with
less, often do not have the time or inclination to
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. . .Many of the questions in the survey require
substantial analysis: there are no brief answers.
This requires manpower. The downsizing glidepath
has severely hampered our ability to respond to
these similar tasking in different formats. Here
at (unit) we have a one man Reinvention Lab staff
and he is ....severely bombarded with [other
reinvention projects]
The next two categories, anticipated loss of
jobs and anticipated loss of funds, also ranked high.
The final category, up front costs, was cited
as the least distractive to the labs in their pursuit of
logistics change. The general view was presented that up
front costs are a significant barrier to the labs. However,
lab representatives conveyed that in relation to other
barriers, the labs had more control and options to deal with
this particular impediment, i.e., they could either:
• Sell the initiative to their higher unit. In
most cases, justifications of savings would
allow them to obtain the necessary funding.
Pursue the initiative regardless of the up front
costs. The labs conveyed the view that, by and
large, their organizations would elect to implement
the initiatives as they would ultimately save more
by its installment. It should be noted, that one
particular lab desired to develop a high cost
information management system. Current funding did
not allow this to be instituted so, ultimately, the




(2.) Ranking of "Barriers to the Waiver
Process" (Question 8a) . Table 10 and its associated graph,
Graph 2, show the outcome of the results for the laboratory-
representatives' input on the "Support for Waivers"
question. Although the data exhibits a bimodal
distribution, some trends can be identified.
Table 10: Barriers to Waiver Process by
Hierarchical Level












4 6.25% 25.00% 25.00%
3 18.75% 18.75% 31.25%





























First, senior DoD Leadership was ranked by
25% of the labs as having the highest impediment influence.
Although no test for correlation was done due to the limited
sample size, remarks in the survey responses reflecting that
many of the reinvention labs that ranked DoD/OSD with the
least impediment category also stated that they worked very
little, if at all, with DoD/OSD in pursuit of waivers.
The second trend was very positive. Fifty
percent of the labs ranked their service level leadership
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with the lowest rating as impediments to the waiver process.
Additionally, as stated, no command ranked its own
service/agency with the greatest impediment ranking. This
evidences a predictable bias to protect one' own service.
At the local command level the most
significant point was that no representative thought that
internal leadership was the greatest problem. There were a
number of cases, however, where internal friction was
present (25% ranked it a 4 and 31.25% ranked it a 3)
.
(3.) Ranking of "Perceived Impediment Caused
by External Statutes or Commands" (Question 8b) .
Significant data was not available on this category because
many representatives did not have to deal with this factor.
A bipolar distribution occurred for those few that did
respond
.
(4.) Ranking of "Perceived Lack of Knowledge
or Experience with Waiver Process or Procedures by
Hierarchical Level" (Question 8c) . The results from the
survey provided insight that, overall, the lab
representatives felt confident with the level of knowledge
of senior DoD Leadership. As shown in Table 11 and Graph
#3, 62.5% of the representatives gave Senior DoD Leadership
one of the two lower impediment rankings. Only 6.25% of the
representatives perceived this as the greatest impediment to
the waiver process.
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Table 1 1 : Perceived Knowledge or
Experience With Waiver Process
by Hierarchical Level
Perceived Knowledge or Experience












4 31.25% 18.75% 17.65%
3 0.00% 6.25% 29.41%
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In this category, service leadership again
fared the best. Fifty percent of the respondents ranked
service level leadership as the lowest problem. The
remaining 50% was evenly distributed throughout the
rankings
.
Internal/local command leadership earned an
average even ranking across the spectrum. This is
understandable as some local commands exhibited superior
knowledge of the waiver process while others were in the
early stages of implementation and were just beginning to
move up the learning curve
.
84
(5.) "Classification to Information
Dissemination Barriers to Waiver Process" (Question 8d) .
The responses to this question did not rate as expected (See
Table 12 and Graph 4) based on the overwhelming weighting of
written and verbal comments given by the lab
representatives. The distribution of ratings for both the
Internet and Waiver/Lessons Learned Data Base categories
were fairly evenly distributed. The data related that the
Points of Contact List was deemed an even lower impediment
to successful waiver implementation. The conclusion that
may be drawn from the data is that although the
representatives thought they would benefit from the creation
and continued maintenance of these "lessons learned"
communication, the labs have been able to work around their
unavailability.
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4 17.65% 11.76% 11.76%
3 29.41% 29.41% 11.76%
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c. Other General Comments
Other important lessons were gleaned from the
survey data. These lessons can be extracted and used to
assist any agency seeking process improvement, particularly
newly forming logistics reinvention laboratories.
3. Results of the Senior Coordinator's Survey
The Senior Coordinator's Survey (Appendix B) was
prepared using the same method described for the "front-
line" representatives survey. Senior coordinators offered
information from their perspective. Ideas expressed in
response included:
a. Pride of Role
Like the front-line reinvention representatives,
the service and agency senior coordinators were very proud
of their efforts. One coordinator, Randa Vagnerini, in
charge of the United States Army's Reinvention efforts,
stated that one of her organizations' greatest
accomplishments was, "To assist Army organizations taking
control of their own destiny".
Jb. Support from Senior Leadership
Most senior coordinators indicated that their
senior leadership was strongly championing the reinvention
cause. All of the survey responses stated that top level
support, Assistant Secretaries of the respective services
and/or Chiefs of Staff, were wading in to fight for
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reinvention. The only negative comment was that
occasionally functional staffs or other offices resisted
change due to conflicting "rice bowl" incentives. Again,
success with change in instituting initiatives almost always
was attained over this friction as a result of the support
and involvement of higher ranked "champions".
c. Cultural Resistance
The single biggest impediment to change indicated
by senior coordinators was general cultural resistance.
From the information obtained from both the "front-line"
surveys and the senior coordinators' surveys, there is a
consensus that people and their organizations can work
around most impediments (absence of resources, limited
information dissemination and etc.) but often cannot
overcome cultural resistance to change. Persuading people
to shift from the "way business has always been done" was
clearly the highest overall hurdle advocates of reinvention
have had to jump.
d. Publicize Success
Senior coordinators emphasized the importance of
"getting the word out" about reinvention successes. This
shares the positive information learned, benefiting other
laboratories, and helps to generate continued support and
enthusiasm for reinvention or reengineering efforts. DoD,
more than the private sector, suffers from fast turn over in
key billets. By continued "banging of the reinvention
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drum", new leaders learn the potential this mindset holds
for improvement of their organization and, ultimately, the
Department of Defense.
e. Loss of Momentum of Reinvention Movement
Senior coordinators agreed that a loss of
organizational momentum with the reinvention movement had
occurred DoD-wide. Senior coordinators also noted that, for
the most part, momentum had suffered periodic pauses, citing
two major causes:
• Loss of Key Champions .
To quote
:
The process has lost momentum because we have some
new leaders and managers who are not fully onboard
with reinvention.
Time and effort is required to bring new leaders
and managers abreast of the importance of reinvention
efforts and its potential results.
• Stretched Resources
The lack of people to pursue the planning,
coordinating and overseeing of reinvention efforts was the
number one problem documented by the senior coordinators.
To quote, as DoD continues to downsize:
. . . people are so busy and stretched out, that
it s hard to get people to take sponsorship of the




. . . people are dual and triple hatted. Without
reinvention being a full time billet, [the
individual] can't give the attention necessary to
address the unlimited potential of the RL
[reinvention lab]
.
f. Comments to Successors
Senior leaders offered the following comments to
stimulate reinvention for individuals tasked to take over
their billets:
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Wise, Senior
Representative/Coordinator for USA
Be proactive.
Randa Vagnerini, Senior Representative/Coordinator
for USA
Develop a strategic plan as to what reinvention is
and what being a lab could do for the Army and get
that plan endorsed by the senior leaders. A plan
that defines common goals and objectives and what
type of common results are expected from each lab.
Reporting to the senior leaders how the plan is
working and what it is doing for the Army
Recognizing those individuals up front that are
making strides with reinvention initiatives.
Keep information flowing upward and downward to
all labs and non-labs.
Get continuous feedback to enhance or improve
future efforts.
Continue to strive to make the processes easier
and more effective.
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Major Mark Kuschel, Senior Coordinator - Labs and
Waivers for USAF
. . . Get high ranking HQ officials to visit the
[Reinvention Labs] RLs more frequently. . .
.
. . .
Establish a more structured approach in
identifying/cascading Best Practices.
C. BEST SUCCESS STORIES
Currently, no data base is available to accurately
identify the total of logistics savings achieved by
Reinvention Labs. Due to the overlapping nature of
logistics, numerous non-logistics oriented Department of
Defense organizations and agencies are making significant
process improvements but, are not reporting them as such.
Additionally, many logistics savings are being instituted by
the labs but are classified as saving to their primary
missions (e.g., Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation, Reengineering through information) category.
This next section provides summaries of success stories
that may be used as benchmarks in addition to illustrating
the potential savings from reinvention efforts in logistics.
Due to the lack of quantitative savings data on Reinvention
Lab logistics initiatives, a summary of the "top five"
initiatives is provided. The analysis of resources saved







3 Test and Support Equipment
4 Data
5. Packaging, Handling, Storage and
Transportation
6 Training and Training Support
7 Manpower and Personnel
8 Computer Resources Support
9. Design Interface
10. Facilities
The five cases show how logistics reinvention may be
implemented across a diversity of logistics activities.
These cases also show unique approaches to implementing
entrepreneurial concepts within DoD.
1 . Closed Loop Wood Recycling, Defense Distributions
Depot, Susquehanna
At the 1997 Reinvention Symposium, Jerry Clemens,
Special Operations Logistics Division, Defense Distributions
Depot, Susquehanna (DDDS) , Pennsylvania provided one of the
best examples of what reinvention is about. He spoke on
"Closed Loop Wood Recycling" based on the experience of the
Distributions Depot, Susquehanna, Pennsylvania (DDSP) Wood
Reclamation and Recycling Program. The was the largest " and
perhaps most noteworthy reinvention program presented at the
Symposium.
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The prototype wood and pallet recycling program
involves DDDS operation of two sites at New Cumberland, PA
and Mechanicsburg, PA. It is a ten million dollar
distribution operation, and processes more than 20,000
demands by customers with over $4 billion in inventory. Its
history is that DDDS was faced with potential fines in
violation of Executive Order (EO) 12873 and excessive
disposal costs. DDSP had to take immediate steps to reduce
its solid waste stream.
Table 13 is a summary of DDSP waste and materials
costs
:
Table 13. Defense Distribution Depot, Susquehanna,
Pennsylvania - Solid Waste Stream and Costs
Item Amount or Cost (per year)
Tons to Landfill 48,000 tons
Wood waste 40,000 tons
Cost to dispose of waste $2.4 million
Cost to dispose of wood waste $2.0 million
(Clemens, 1997, p. 12)




Table 14. Defense Distribution Depot, Susquehanna,
Pennsylvania - Costs to Transport and
Package Supplies
Item Amount or Cost (per year)
Pallets $2.9 million
Dimension lumber (Board Feet) $0.6 million
Packaging materials $2 . 9 million
Total $6.4 million
(Clemens, 1997, p. 13)
After analyzing the data, targets of opportunity for cost
savings were identified as:
1. Pallets cost $8.00 each for a total cost of $3
million per year.
2. Dimension lumber costs were increasing 50 to 60
cents per board foot.
3
.
Cardboard shipping containers cost almost as much
as the cost of the items being shipped. (Clemens,
1997, p. 13)
DDSP employees and management identified the following
potential savings (see Table 15):
Table 15. Defense Distribution Depot, Susquehanna,
Pennsylvania, - Potential Cost Savings
Item Cost Savings (per year)
Landfill cost avoidance $2.0 million
Pallets $2.9 million
Dimension lumber $0.6 million
Packaging materials $2.9 million
Total $8.4 million
(Clemens, 1997, p. 14)
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The potential cost savings for pallets, dimension
lumber and packaging materials must be viewed as ultimate
limits. These savings imply 100 percent recycling savings.
While these savings may be obtainable for a short period of
time, realistically replacement materials will be required
over the long run to replace pallets and packaging material
that are damaged beyond repair. DDSP conducted a study of
commercial practices to understand what Georgia Pacific
Corporation, International Paper Company and Stone Container
Corporation did with solid waste and to determine what
metrics to benchmark against. (Clemens, 1997, p. 68)
Partnerships were established to bring the best practices to
the government processes. Additionally, commercial wood
recyclers were visited to observe operations. An analysis
of commercial industry practices revealed
1. Over $5.5 billion per year in new pallet sales.
2. Over 600 million new pallets produced per year.
3. Over 65 million pallets received for recycling.
a. 15 percent of all pallets were sorted and
reused.
b. 62 percent of all pallets were repaired and
reused.
c. 14 percent off all pallets were cut down and 82
percent of the parts were reused.
d. Less than 10 percent of remaining waste was
turned into mulch and fuel by a grinding and
chopping process.
4. One billion board feet of lumber is used to make
pallets, of which 912 million board feet is
reused. (Clemens, 1997, pp. 16-17)
95
A waiver to sell pallets was requested to avoid
the requirement for the Defense Reutilization Management
Office (DRMO) to sell excess government property. (Clemens,
1997) This process took six months and required numerous
debates between the contracts and legal departments before
the Depot Commander decided to do it
.
The Grocery Manufacturers' Association pallets are
"graded into good, repairable, or cut -down using the
marketplace standards." (Clemens, 1997, p. 20) Pallets
were manually sorted into different grades of quality.
Government pallets are 48 inches wide and commercial pallets
are 40 inches wide. New pallets cost about $8.25 per
pallet. The recycled pallets were sold for as high as $4.51
per pallet. After less than six months $350,000 in revenues
from the sale of pallets had been achieved. (Clemens, 1997)
Employees at DDSP suggested that an analysis be
made to determine if some pallets could be remanufactured.
It was estimated that up to 16,000 pallets per month could
be rebuilt. Despite labor costs of $30.00 per hour it was
determined that pallets could be remanufactured for between
$5.56 and $6.00 each. This could save about $2.00 per
pallet by using rebuilt pallets. The pallet rebuilding
process is described below:
1
.
Pallets with more than one or two board repairs
required are cut down from military to commercial
length.
2 The stringers and deck boards removed during this
process are reused for other repairs.
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3. The waste pieces are separated by deck boards,
top, bottom and stringers.
4
.
The reusable boards are then "bunked" or stacked
by type
.
5. The component parts are remanufactured into a
recycled pallet and reused. (Clemens, 1997, p.
32)
DDSP experimented with using other top board materials such
as recycled plywood and is participating in the process to
reengineer military pallets using recycled materials for. new
military and commercial applications.
All wood waste is delivered to the Reclamation
Center for screening and separation. Wooden containers that
were once discarded are repaired and put back into service.
Many of these boxes cost about $75 each. Dimension lumber
is sorted by size and cut to size for custom orders. In the
past, only virgin timber was used for fabrication of skids
and dunnage. According to Clemens, the new policy resulted
in a 40-60 percent per month reduction in procurement of
virgin timber -- cash which upset the virgin timber
industry. Clemens estimated that over $60,000 per year of
board length lumber was being buried. Now the wood is
denailed by hand. The finished products are put into
inventory for use by the fabrication shops. Orders for wood
are "faxed to the Reclamation Center and precut dimension
recycled lumber is used to fabricate the crate, skid, or
dunnage" to meet custom orders. (Clemens, 1997, p. 36)
Excess lumber scraps are organized by size and sold. All
remaining wood waste is transported to a contractor where it
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is "ground and screened using a hammer mill. All fasteners
and nails are removed by magnetic drums in the conveyor
process, and are sold as scrap metal to a local recycler.
The final product is 100 percent biodegradable landscape
mulch." (Clemens, 1997, pp. 39-43) The mulch is sold back
to DDSP at a discount of $60 per ton and used on the
installation.
Reengineering of a 100 percent recycled content
cardboard specification for shipping containers was the next
DDSP initiative. Clemens estimated that 25 tons per week of
cardboard costing $3 million per year are used in packaging
supplies. Previously old corrugated cardboard was sold to a
local recycler who sold the material for about $125 per ton
in the east and $200 per ton in the west. The new process
sells the cardboard to a contractor who "uses the fiber to
produce a recycled content shipping container." The
recycled containers are then sold back to DDSP and used for
shipping.
One barrier that had to be overcome was a DoD
specification that was 30 years old and designed, "just in
case," with high performance requirements. A Georgia
Pacific Corporation 12 x 12 x 12 inch fiberboard box has a
bursting strength of 200 pounds and costs 40 cents each.
However, a DoD box that meets military specifications costs
about $1.40 each. One of the most expensive shipping
containers is a tri-wall, which costs $50.00 with a pallet;
and DDSP processes 500 per day to customers. A fiberboard
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container costs between $22.50 and $25.00 without the
pallet. Even adding a cost of $8.00 for a new pallet, it is
still cheaper, to use fiberboard recycled containers. DLA
headquarters authorized a waiver to the military
specification and a six month test was performed. The
results indicated that the recycled boxes met all customer
requirements and performed satisfactorily. The FY 1995
audited savings were $900,000. An agreement was made with
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, to return containers to be used
again. Now only after containers are no longer usable will
they be disposed of to a cardboard recycler. The goal of
DDSP is to eventually be able to reduce the Working Capital
Fund (WCF) (previously known as the Defense Business
Operations Fund (DBOF) ) costs and provide better service at
a reduced cost to its customers.
Lessons learned by DDSC included:
1
.
Use the Plan/Do/Study/Act Cycle instead of
Do/Study/React/then plan.
2 Keep asking why when "bureaucracy" fights
positive change.
3 Create a team atmosphere to improve processes
and solve problems.
4. Use benchmarking ("steal industry good
ideas") .
5 Incorporate team atmosphere at the lowest
level (many of the key players with good
ideas are the operators
.
2. Marine Corps Recruit Depots, San Diego
Marine Corps Recruit Depots, San Diego presented a
superb example of a successful reengineering process that
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incorporated both logistics and human resource issues. An
extremely innovative molding of commercial capabilities to
meet military needs in a cost effective manner was explained
by Debbie Ruiz, the Deputy Assistant, Quality Management at
Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) , San Diego.
Ruiz explained how the recruiting depots have in the
past used a time consuming, effort-intense, moneyless (chit-
based) system to deter thievery in bootcamp. These
serialized paper chits were issued to the recruits in place
of money to aid in the tracking of illegal activities. All
of the merchants located on the base accepted these chits in
exchange for services or supplies. This system however had
several distinct disadvantages. First, managing the
inventory and accounting of the chits was extremely labor
intensive. The system also employed the equivalent of six
full time personnel who reconciled the chits a total of
three times.
In place of this system, several key players within
MCRD proposed a process that maintains the moneyless recruit
environment yet removed all of the resource intense
inventory requirements of the chit system. The MCRD team
proposed to the Depots, DFAS and the banking institutions a
win-win reengineering solution. The new process serves all
new recruits by issuing them an ATM card. Although most
MCRD San Diego recruits are issued a Marine Corps West ATM
card, as part of a cooperative agreement, it is up to the
recruits to select their banking institutions. The banking
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institutions benefit from the use of the recruits' direct
deposit funds. Recruits benefit from the ease of use and
versatility of the ATM card instead of the chits. Depots
and their vendors no longer have to spend countless
personnel hours on accounting and tracking of the chits.
Additionally, the vendors refund time has been cut
significantly by the immediate payment by electronic funds.
Other benefits resulting from this resourceful venture are:
• Elimination of the chit system saved 2 1/2
days during the depots training schedule
(i.e., 2 1/2 to use for other required
training)
.
• Electronic Point of Sale equipment installed
in all service areas. DFAS provided a
$260,000 grant to aid in the purchase of the
capital equipment
.
• Accounting reports are done automatically.
• Traveler's check costs were reduced by
$100,000 annually.
• Payroll Production time reduced.
• Decreased the number of lost/stolen treasury
checks
.
• Eliminated reporting of check issue data to
the Treasury Department
.
• Reduced check production by $780,000 per
year
.
• Shifted six depots positions to front line
service jobs.
• Marine Corps West replaced recruits' chit
class with a more practical, educational
class on balancing their budget and on
banking practices.
• Estimated savings of $1.7 million annually.
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The success of this program has motivated MCRD and the
Marine Corps to pursue other improvements in similar areas.
They intend to offer the steps they took to implement this
process to other similar DoD organizations. They also are
looking at automating their retail clothing collections,
refining their pay audit techniques, revising their travel
service practices and assess other use of electronic data
interchange
.
3. Action Workout: An Accelerator to Continuous
Improvement - USAF
This third example shows how one service is using a
special organization specifically tasked to assess,
recommend, and instruct other organizations on implementing
process improvement. Senior Master Sergeant Dave Griffin,
Action Workout Facilitator, Air Combat Command Quality
Insurance, Langley AFB, Virginia explained at the
reinvention symposium that the Air Force has continuously
pushed for Total Quality Leadership/Management and process
improvement, both prior to and during the period of
reinvention in DoD. The Action Workout (AWO) team approach
demonstrates continued emphasis in this arena. AWOs are
experienced process improvement teams that attempt to
provide an objective analysis of how to improve existing
work practices. The AWO teams have met with significant
success during their initial stages of deployment.
The history of the use of AWO teams originates with the
fact that the AWO developers were trained by industry (GE
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and Pratt and Whitney) . Additionally, they learned and
benefited from corporate consultants who assisted them on
their initial projects. The team candidates selection
process involves choosing members by Commander Air Combat
Command (COMACC) and staff, and the teams are used to
provide the change "message" to field units from COMACC.
AWO objectives include:
A. Reducing cycle times through:
1. Eliminating waste systematically.
2. Reducing man hours.
3. Reducing building floor space.
B. Improving service quality through:
1. Simplifying processes, procedures, and
methods
.
2. Establishing visual control mechanisms.
3. Installing "mistake proof" systems.
C. Improving job enrichment through:
1. Direct employee input opportunity.
2. "Multi-skilling" of staff through better
training.
3. Improving work area conditions and safety.
The concept of AWOs is driven by fiscal need to:
improve processes in the work center, work with process
owners/operators, use high energy, barrier-free
communication (consultant teams called in by senior leaders
have top level support) , concentrate efforts to eliminate
waste on the spot and to increase productivity. Seven
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"types of waste" are attacked by the teams: rework,
overproduction, transportation and conveyance, inventory,
unnecessary motion, unnecessary processing, and cycle time
(to reduce the "hurry up and wait" problem) . The ultimate
goal of AWOs is removal or reduction of non-value added
activities that raise costs for the USAF
.
Increases in productivity have resulted from the
following "lean production" approaches:
• Pull vs. push production.
• Reducing work in process.
• Production leveling.
• Improving work processes.
• Improving physical plant layout.
• Reducing work defects.
• Establishing visual controls.
The AWO five step process ("sacred for successful
results") for improvement requires:
• Identifying real needs.
• Site visit/prework.
• Unit preparation and data review (2-3 weeks)
.
• The AWO intervention event, (i.e. Action Workout
Team on site - 1 week long)
.
• Senior commander briefed everyday at 1600.
• Follow-on action to see that implementation has
followed the path of intervention.
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A "critical need" is to have a senior leader present
for the end of day outbriefs, summary, review, and a follow-
on action planning conference. AWO leverage to achieve
change is provided by:
• Visible leadership commitment to the mission,
people, and improving performance.
• Expanded AWO training that fosters "learning
leaders" with higher expectations.
• Reducing cycle times dramatically to alleviate
operation tempo problems.
• Providing "bureaucracies" an opportunity to become
part of the "solution".
• Taking performance to the next level through
"process certification"
.
AWO success stories include the following:
McDill AFB Physical Exam Process Improvement
Pre AWO
1. Physical scheduling process 180 minutes
2
.
Administrative cycle time 140 minutes
3 Exam results average cycle time 120 days
4. Process step 19
5. Patient movement distance 1000 feet
6 Additional travel on average 3 . 5 miles x 2











B-1B Bomber Lubrication and Service Process









Heat exchanger flushing no
longer required
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The next step after AWO intervention involves:
• Standardization of improvements.
• Expanding use of AWO to "Wing Power Teams".
• Applying "quality in daily operations" throughout
the USAF.
• Expand Action Workout throughout entire Air Force.
A summary of lessons learned from the AWO experience thus
far is that change requires:
1. Total leadership commitment -- from the
headquarters to the flight line.
2
.
"Closing the Loop" on continuous improvement
actions
.
3. Identifying the "critical path" (remove or reduce
all other non-value added steps)
.
4. Applying video technologies (to view and study,
daily operations)
.
5. Empowering process owners to "change their world."
"Generating innovation in the workplace is
contagious !
"
6 Embedding engineers and experts to make them part
of the solution.
7. Expanding training to foster "learning leaders"
with higher expectations.
8. Tolerance for failures -- leaders must permit
failure if processes are to improve.
4 . Defense Personnel Support Center Business
Practices Reengineering
Mae DeVincentis from the Defense Personnel Support
Center provided a presentation on the success of
reengineering her organizations also at the 1997 Reinvention
Symposium. Her presentation was entitled, "Reengineering
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Business Practices." Speaking about how to start
reinvention, she focused on her organization's mission
statement : "The mission of the Defense Personnel Support
Center (DPSC) is to ensure the combat readiness and
sustainment of America's fighting forces by providing world
class logistical support in peace and war." (DeVincentis,
1997) From this statement the DPSC Vision was derived "To
be the worldwide provider of logistics services, to champion
military readiness, and to be the leader in business
innovation." (DeVincentis, 1997) DPSC business is "big
business," with gross sales in 1996 totaling $3,193.3
million. Three major commodities accounted for a large part
of their business: food -- $1107.2 million, clothing --
$1060.7 million, and medical supplies -- $1025.4 million.
(DeVincentis, 1997)
As with many other DoD organizations, DPSC perceives
both opportunities and threats in change, depending on how
challenges are managed. These include downsizing, emerging
technology, reinvention, globalization of markets, increased
competition, acquisition reform and radical organizational
redesign
.
The DPSC Strategic Plan incorporates reengineering and
application of best business practices. Business practices
improvements include electronic tracking of items, cross-
docking, using dedicated trucks and airplanes, and in some
cases commercial distribution. The key to success for DPSC
is to, "Keep inventory in motion". (DeVincentis, 1997)
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Industry and customer relationships are also part of the
reinvention improvement package. Reengineering industry
relationships involves:
• Inviting increased industry participation using
industry teaming and organization/function IPTs.
• Commercial product design and warranty.
• Best value buying methods
.
• Mult i- source matrixing to avoid government unique
practices and to use commercial buying processes.
Reengineering customer relationships requires DPSC to
continue to be readiness oriented and to be more involved in
technology transfer using its customer liaison offices,
electronic catalogs to improve product visibility and
choice, to make available more reliable ordering information
and delivery services, to reinstill a genuine customer focus
centering on, "knowing and satisfying customer needs."
According to DeVincentis, DPSC is trying to change from
being "... ineffective, duplicative, confusing and costly,"
to an effective agency that employs "fortified CBUs,
leveraged synergy among staff offices, improved allocation
of overhead, a streamlined staff, improved customer service
techniques and a strategy to instill a new culture." These
are the most difficult challenges.
Reengineered business practices implemented by DPSC
include the following examples:
• Designations of "prime vendors"
• Design of a mail order pharmacy
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• Vendor managed inventory
• Vendor park
DPSC's "New Strategy" is intended to represent to customers
the evidence of their ability to reduce inventories, provide
faster, better quality services at lower costs.
Speaking on Prime Vendor specifically, DeVincentis
reported that the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a
report on June 4, 1993 that "recommended the Secretary of
Defense direct all four Services and DLA to conduct a
demonstration project using commercial food distributors
(prime vendors) to provide direct delivery of food to
military dining facilities in the continental US". (DPSC,
1996, p. 1) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Logistics) (DUSD(L)) issued a memorandum on August 16, 1993
to the military department Secretaries and the Director, DLA
requesting that a Joint Task Group (JTG) be formed to
perform a demonstration project. (DeVincentis, 1997) The
JTG chose to conduct the demonstration project in the four-
state area of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida and Alabama
because this area included dining facilities from all four
services in both metropolitan and remote areas. This
project represents a paradigm shift from the existing DoD
subsistence supply system. The four services have different
systems. DeVincentis said DPSC had to develop a unique
interface for each service and coordinate payment to the
vendor for each service. (DeVincentis, 1997)
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The Prime Vendor program used commercial products,
commercial business practices and emerging technologies.
Long-term price, product, and distribution contracts with
suppliers of various goods were made using electronic
commerce. (DeVincentis, 1997) The Subsistence Total Order
and Receipt Electronic System (STORES) is a multiple vendor
and product line ordering system done using electronic data
interchange that uses a facsimile backup transition to order
products from. electronic catalogs and lists. (DPSC, 1997,
p. 2) Delivery is provided within 48 hours to the ordering
galley and multiple orders per day can be made. Commercial
off-the-shelf products instead of food made to military
specifications is provided to bases. DeVincentis said a 1-2
percent fee for Prime Vendor is charged instead of - the
previous 11-20 percent surcharge. The requirement to order
food several weeks in advance is eliminated and the
requirement to have a large local inventory is eliminated.
The direct delivery program enables the reduction of
intermediate supply points and their associated inventories.
These supply points normally held between 30 to 60 days of
semi -perishable and frozen food, fresh fruits and
vegetables. (DPSC, 1996 p. 2) The requirement to make
large economic order quantities to receive the best price is
eliminated. Customers do not receive food that is issued
past the expiration date and which then has to be certified
as edible. The International Food Service Distributors
Association statistics indicate commercial vendors inventory
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turnover rate of semi-perishable items is thirteen times a
year compared to a DoD rate of once a year. (DPSC, 1996, p.
3) The dining facility can refuse delivery on the spot of
any unsatisfactory or non-ordered items. The delivery agent
assists in resolving these problems. This increases
customer satisfaction, as opposed to the traditional
bureaucratic response.
The DA Operations Research Office (DOOR) performed a
cost analysis of the Prime Vendor program during the
demonstration phase. A "market basket" of goods valued at
$10 million, which was approximately 25 percent of total
sales was selected. (DPSC, 1996, p. 4) This value is the
procurement cost DPSC would have paid under the traditional
system to purchase and distribute these items. These costs
include "transportation costs, DA depot operating costs,
DPSC and Defense Subsistence Office (DSO) operating costs,
DFAS financial services, and end user infrastructure (e.g.,
warehouses, subsistence personnel, support equipment) at
individual military installations." (DPSC, 1996 p. 4)
Prime Vendor replaces transportation and depot costs with a
fee
.
Because the demonstration was a test, no facilities
were allowed to be closed or personnel displaced. However,
there are definite savings that will be achieved in this
area. End user support, DPSC and DSO costs and DFAS
financial services costs were artificially declared equal
under both systems. However, in reality this is not the
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case and the report acknowledges that there would be
personnel reductions and cost savings. Under these
constraints the costs of Prime Vendor exceeded DoD costs
during the demonstration. An estimated break even point of
about $2000K dollars was determined by accounting for
reductions in DoD infrastructure. (DPSC, 1996, p. 4) These
reductions would include "closing or reducing end user
subsistence facilities, reducing the numbers of subsistence
support personnel, and reducing support equipment." (DPSC,
1996, p. 5) Despite the initial constraints some
infrastructure savings were actually achieved by reducing
personnel from 157 to 103 with payroll and benefit savings
of $1.4 million. Warehouse usage decreased by the following
amounts (see Table 16)
:
Table 16. Decreased Warehouse Usage Due to
Prime Vendor Initiative




Naval Station Mayport 26,000
(DPSC, 1996, p. 5)
The requirement for cold storage and associated utility
costs were reduced.
The basic cost of food was determined to be higher
because name brands instead of generic brands were bought
.
However, longer term contracts of higher volume will reduce
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this difference when the Prime Vendor program is expanded to
the Continental United States. Other savings identified
include a one time savings from reduction in DoD food
inventories. It was estimated that the inventory reduction
savings for the four state area was over $18 million and the
annual carrying cost savings were $700,000 per year.
Military construction funds to build, modernize and maintain
existing subsistence facilities will be reduced by an
undetermined amount . Prime Vendor contracts require sharing
of rebates between the vendors and government . These
savings amounted to over $500,000 during the demonstration
which equaled a 1.6 percent rebate. These savings will
offset the DoD overhead to manage Prime Vendor. (DPSC,
1996, p. 6)
DeVincentis stated that in the middle of the test
during 1994, Congress was satisfied with the performance of
the Prime Vendor program and directed the expansion to the
rest of the Continental facilities. Currently there are
multiple vendors being used and the entire Continental US is
using Prime Vendor. Prime Vendor does not currently cover
Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs) and other combat rations or
overseas units food supplies. The DON has 25 unique food
items that DPSC continues to provide.
5. IMPAC Card
One of the most beneficial commercial practice that the
government has copied and adapted for use in the area of
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purchasing is the IMPAC Card (International Merchant
Purchase Authorization Card) or credit card. Introduced as
another small purchase procurement method for both day-to-
day logistics needs and for minor acquisitions, the IMPAC
card has changed the way the Department of Defense does
business daily. Initially promoted in 1993 by the National
Performance Review, the card did not gain momentum until
1994, when the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
was enacted and Executive Order 12931 on procurement reform
was issued. FASA removed many of the impeding restrictions,
for purchases worth $2,500 or less, allowing DoD to fully
benefit from IMPAC as private industry does with the use of
their credit cards. "Of 21 million [acquisition
transactions in government], 90 percent are under $2,500".
(Laurent, 1997, p. 31)
Savings from the use of the IMPAC Card come from
several sources. Initially the IMPAC Card was used in place
of purchase orders or Blank Purchase Agreements (BPA)
.
(McMahon, 1995) This practice reduced order processing time
from six hours to two hours. Additionally, the GAO ' s August
1996 cost benefit studies showed that use of the IMPAC Card
vice the traditional purchase order saves the government $54
per transaction. (Laurent, 1997, p. 32) However,
considering other savings, "The Army Audit Agency reported
that using IMPAC cost $92.60 less per transaction than using
purchase orders". (Laurent, 1997, p. 32)
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The Navy had initially been the most aggressive with
exploiting the benefits of this card. However, the Army






/impac.htm, Dec 96) To quote the FORSCOM release:
Reengineering within the Department of the Army
has become a critical part of the ongoing
reinvention of government. One of the many ways
in which this can be clearly seen is the
establishment of a new method of purchasing low-
cost supplies- -the International Merchant Purchase
Authorization Card.
In FY 95 Forces Command (FORSCOM) has saved $27.9
million in administrative costs and cold cash.
For FY96, FORSCOM has projected to save $31.3
million. These FY 95 figures were comprised by
avoiding 318,000 purchase orders that cost the
government $54 each. Equivalent to handle




//www . forscom . army . mil/pao/Jan96_releases/im
pac.htm Dec 96)
In addition to the money saved is the immense amount of time
saved in purchasing logistics items and low cost acquisition
items and subsequent reduction in personnel to process
orders. To quote Suzy Lyons, chief, Policy and Management
Team, Directorate of Logistics, Forces Command, "The old
procurement cycle could take as long as three months before





To illustrate this point of potential savings further a
quote from the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment
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Station 1 logistics survey is included. By evaluating their
needs and processes they achieved:
...transforming a Logistics Division by merging
various functional responsibilities with
organizational elements with complimentary
responsibility. A supply and warehouse operations
was eliminated by implementing the IMPAC Card.
The need for multiple warehouses was reduced and
"Supplies and materials can be procured though the
Internet using GSA Advantage program at a low
price and are delivered directly to the ordering
office often within one day. The WES enhanced
responsiveness and realized a $200,000 cost
avoidance per annum.
The goal was for the Army overall, in FY97, to use the
IMPAC card for 80 percent of their estimated 2.4 million
micro-purchases. The tremendous push by senior leaders at
all levels, especially by Army Chief of Staff General
Reimer, has allowed the Army to far surpass this
requirement. As of June 19 97, the Army purchased 9 0.8
percent of their 2.4 million micropurchases using the IMPAC
Card. (Laurent, 1997) Using rough calculations of $54 per
transaction multiplied by 2.2 million transaction equates to
an optimum potential savings of $118,800,000.00.
The other services are benefiting as well. To show
what this initiative is doing for the Marine Corps, this
quote from DFAS ' s homepage is provided:
IMPAC implementation is set. Turner said 75 to 80
percent of all papers that come to vendor pay can
be eliminated, adding that with 1,500 invoices
waiting for receiving reports so they can be paid,
a lot of interest is accruing. With IMPAC, DFAS
can pay bills more quickly. Annual savings to the
Marine Corps is estimated at $3 million.
(http
:
//www . dfas . news/dfaszine/win97/agency4 . htm)
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Statistics gained from the Naval Supply Command's
Homepage (http://www.navsup.navy/nsrf/navsuphq.htm) provided
that As of July 1, 1997, 76 percent of all DoN's
micropurchases were bought with the card. The resulting
876,373 transactions multiplied by the $54 savings would
amount to $47,324,142.
The IMPAC article provided additional information to
calculate all four services and the Veterans Affairs input.
An estimate of 10 million total transactions by the four
services is obtained by taking the following facts:
• Army makes 23% of all governmental purchases.
• Army is projected in 1997 to conduct 2.3 million
transactions alone.
Taking the 23 million transactions divided by 23
percent equates to 10 million purchases for the federal
government. Since the four services and Veterans Affairs
produce 57% of the total transactions, a rough estimate of
5.7 million by these organizations is derived. Since each
transaction saves a minimum of $54 dollars over using blank
purchase orders, a total of $307,800,000 in savings annually
is achieved. (Laurent, 1997, p. 35)
Additional savings are achieved from two forms of
rebates offered by the banking institutions for early
payments of bills. Agencies can earn two types of rebates.
The first type is a saving of up to two basis points (each
point equates . to 1/1000 of a percent) on annual purchases.
The VA is getting the maximum rebate of $6.60 per $1,000 for
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paying its bills within 54 days of receiving them.
(Laurent, 1997, p. 35) From August to January (6 months),
the Army, Navy, and Veterans Affairs earned $1,972,365.
This would equal $3,944,730 for a full year.
Another saving is going to be obtained when DoD
converts to Rocky Mountain/First Bank's Corporate payment
system. This will remove an estimated $580,000 per year in
interest payments. On invoice disputes, DoD will pay the
invoice first instead of waiting for customers to reconcile
each charge
.
The future holds increased savings through the IMPAC
card. The rough estimates above do not include DLA savings.
Additionally, with each passing year, more and more commands
achieve greater utilization of the card thus obtaining
greater benefits. The Army illustrates this point the best.
The Army has increased the value of its purchases by 3 92%;
from $2.7 million in 1990 to $750.5 million dollars in 1996.
Very conservative estimates of savings are show below
in Table 17. These savings do not include reduction in
personnel, man-hours, and other anticipated savings.
Table 17 . IMPAC Card Savings
Transaction savings from using IMPAC $307,800,000.00
vice BPA
Savings from rebates $ 3,944,730.00
Savings from interest costs $ 580,000.00
Total Savings; $312/324,730 .00
(Jenkins, 1997)
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This estimate of the savings indicates the potential
for greater savings across the Department of Defense.
D. KEY FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE LEVEL OF LOGISTICS
REINVENTION
This section provides an analysis of critical factors
that appear to influence the level of lab success. These
common elements are derived from literature review and the
perspectives provided by Reinvention Lab representatives at
the 1997 Reinvention Lab Symposium and the survey of the
Reinvention Lab representatives. It is important to note
that these factors are universal and are not limited to the
area of logistics. For new labs seeking change through
reengineering and reinventing, it is critical to incorporate
the elements of success and to plan wisely.
1. Factors Leading to Success for Logistics
Reinvention Laboratories
The data confirmed eight reoccurring elements key to
achieving successful organizational change. These factors
incorporate evolutionary, sound leadership and management
practices, many of which have been tested in private
industry. These common factors span organizational size and
functional boundaries:
a. Acquiring and maintaining commitment of top leadership.
b. A clear vision, organization goals and a plan of action
to achieve them.
c. A sense of urgency to these goals.
d. Communicating the vision, goals, and plan of action to
everyone in the organization.
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e. Establishing performance standards to track, control
and adjust direction of organization.
f
.
An understanding of obstacles to change and persistence
in overcoming them. (Jones and Thompson, 1997, p. 127)
g. Recognition of successes and extraordinary efforts
h. Institutionalizing a continuous improvement mindset and
a willingness to experiment. (Goldstein, 1997)
a. Commitment of Senior Leadership.
Reinvention success depends heavily on steadfast
support from
.
senior leadership. In the more successful
reinvention examples, closed loop recycling at DDSP, the
Marine Corps recruit depot direct -deposit program, and the
Army's IMPAC program, top-level management support was
clearly evident and a driving factor.
Senior support arises for many reasons -- personal
or organizational goals, unit pride, mission and budgetary
necessity. In many cases, these reasons open the door for
innovative practices to be implemented. DDSP senior
leadership was driven to innovate by potentially heavy fines
for compliance with environmental quality laws. Prime
Vendor was propelled by a GAO report recommending
commercialization of food supply in the military. Unit
commanders requested the Air Force Action Workout team visit
their locations to offer suggestions for change. In each
case, innovation was sought out and committed leadership was
evident.
What happens when the commitment falters?
Examples of uncommitted leadership show that waning support
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impedes successful initiation if not doom a reinvention
initiative. Without commitment, badly needed resources
(time, money, and people) get shifted to other areas viewed
as more important -- leaving the initiative without the
means to succeed. Consider, for example, the U.S. Army
Forces Command (FORSCOM) , Fort McPherson Georgia. FORSCOM
was designated a Reinvention Laboratory in December 1994.
(DoD, 1996) The Strategic Systems Division, reporting
directly to the FORSCOM Chief of Staff and participating in
command planning, was created to manage FORSCOM'
s
reinvention efforts. With this senior support came direct
communication to key management, badly need resources and a
sense of urgency to implement these initiatives. (FORSCOM,
1997, p. 5-8). Reinvention efforts achieving dramatic cost
savings and order of magnitude improvements in efficiency
and effectiveness under this level of support resulted.
(Jones and Thompson, 1997, p. 118)
However, this all came to halt a few years later.
Personnel and organizational changes have significantly
reduced Strategic Systems ' once strong influence and
capability to institute successful change. The new head of
Strategic Systems had no background with reinvention and
placed little emphasis on it. Additionally, key leadership
within the FORSCOM leadership structure had rotated, leaving
Strategic Systems without strong backing from higher
headquarters. These changes in structure placed Strategic
Systems six steps out in the chain of command hierarchy.
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(Hagemann, 1997) Resources and senior level interest
withered away. Junior personnel replaced the once high
level seniors with the power to implement at the reinvention
meetings. Reinvention was stagnant if not almost non-
existent. FORSCOM representatives expressed considerable
frustration. This once justifiably proud, premier
reinvention organization now was being pronounced "dead" by
its representatives. (Hagemann, 1977)
Jb. A Clear Vision, Organization Goals and a Plan
of Action to Achieve Them.
The second element of successful reinvention
laboratories is the ability to establish a clear vision and
corresponding plan of action to achieve this vision.
Recruit Depots San Diego is a good example. Starting with
an initial directive by DoD to use electronic fund transfer
to pay active duty personnel, the MCRD Financial Team
established a solid vision incorporating credit cards,
checking accounts, and direct deposit to achieve greater
effectiveness and efficiency. From this vision, an
integrated, solid plan, incorporating all critical
stakeholders, was created and subsequently executed. (Ruiz,
1997)
DDSP also illustrates this point. The DDSP had a
clear vision -- 100% closed-loop recycling -- and achieved
it. In developing their plan to achieve their vision, DDSP
conducting considerable research, benchmarking private
industry, and analyzing all external and internal factors.
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This comprehensive plan ensured the smoothest possible
execution of this innovative change.
Randa Vagnerini, Director, Strategic Management
and Innovations Division, Management Directorate, Office of
the Chief of Staff, Army emphasizes the importance of this
in stimulating reinvention. Her advice to someone who would
take over her billet:
. . .
develop a strategic plan as to what
reinvention is and what being a lab could do for
the Army and get that plan endorsed by the senior
leaders. A plan that defines common goals and
objectives and what type of results are expected
from each lab. Reporting to the senior leaders
how the plan is working and what it is doing for
the Army
Major Randy Pierce, USAF, working for the Director
of Transportation offers this suggestion to new labs:
The lab should have a clear charter and focus and
there should be buy in on the lab's charter and
focus with each change of command to ensure
success. The charter and focus should be
communicated to senior leadership to establish and
maintain support for the lab.
Disjointed or "ad hoc" planning can result, in
initiative failure or at a minimum, waste of valuable
resources. To quote one representative:
There are too many disjointed initiatives that are
on-going that actually apply under the reinvention
program. Many times, these efforts compete with
each other rather than complimenting each other.
This disjointed approach causes each program to
compete for time and resources of the same staff
offices. • We recommend that single office be




The initial DoD reinvention waiver process was
also an example of this. When first created, the DoD did
not have a standardized waiver request established. As a
result many of the labs complained that the lack of a
formalized process, points of contact list and examples to
benchmark made implementing a waiver almost impossible. The
lack of a coherent plan, with distinct approval steps,
caused many representatives to feel like their pursuit of
the waivers were a waste of effort. A common feeling
expressed was that their waivers fell into, "... a black
hole, never to reappear again". (Dunklin, 1997)
Realizing that every service was in fact implementing its
own procedural requirements and that even these were not
widely disseminated, the DoD/OSD reinvention office promised
to establish a single point of contact and waiver format for
all of DoD. (Foster, 1997) "Within two months after the
1997 conference, the Office of Performance Improvements and
Management Reengineering has a simplified, centralized
process in place and running". (Jones and Thompson, 1997,
p. 120) Web' sites with waiver policy, grant of blanket
waiver authority from the Secretary of Defense, and a
standardized waiver process was instituted on April 2, 1997.
(Jones and Thompson, 1997, p. 121)
c. A Sense of Urgency to These Goals
Without a sense of urgency, reinvention
initiatives lose the critical emphasis of senior leadership
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and respective support of badly needed resources. The
traditional defense organization has many requirements daily
needing attention. The true challenge is prioritizing them
to meet timely each requirement. Leadership must instill
"hard" due dates if action and the subsequent results are to
be seen. One of DoD s most successful reinvention labs, the
Air Combat Command's Action Workout Program, created an "...
atmosphere of crisis in order to prod people to seek
solutions to problems that otherwise might not seem very
important to them." (Griffin, 1997)
This sense of urgency can come from many areas --
congressional mandate, fiscal imperatives, or mission
necessity. However, no matter which the driving factor is,
the senior leader/manager is responsible for setting a
timeline that achieves the ultimate objectives and goal.
The Prime Vendor Program was driven by
congressional pressure. This high level push accelerated
the program and energized the leadership, right on up to the
Secretary of Defense, to support the initiative with all of
the needed resources to research, plan and execute it.
Without such emphasis, it too may have been placed on the
"back burner"
.
The FORSCOM example shows how a sense of urgency,
pushed by senior leadership, ensured success and milestone
accomplishment. Changed leadership in mid-stream shows how
even a well established, successful lab can fail when
support and urgency is removed.
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d. Communicating the Vision, Goals, and Plan of
Action to Everyone in the Organization
Once a vision, goals, and plan of action -are
established, a common management principle is to ensure that
all employees know of, and more importantly understand,
them. By doing this, everyone learns an understanding of
their role within the organization and how they fit into
accomplishing the goals and plans of action. This is
especially important in reengineering and reinvention
efforts. Everyone must be "brought on board" with the new
ideas or processes. Organizational change is no easy task.
However, good organizations sell the new ideas up and down
the organization.
The more successful reinvention labs clearly
convey this point. David Whipple, of the Naval Postgraduate
School, for example, felt it was one of the cornerstones to
his organization's success. His impressive salesmanship and
marketing of NPS ' s vision as the Navy's corporate university
to the senior Navy chain of command, OSD, and potential
customers, enabled NPS ' s customer base to rise exponentially
while other DoD educational institutes are fighting for
survival
.
A second example was Defense Contract Management
Command (DCMC) . Admiral Leonard Vincent, the Director of
DCMC, personally briefed each of his commanding officers
about the importance of the Process Oriented Contract
Administration Services Program. Additionally, he ensured
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that the word got out about this need to every employee by
mandating the review of a video tape containing his vision
and strategic plan for this program.
The initial handling of the reinvention process
illustrates the problems associated with not communicating
these essential points. Discussion with lab representatives
at the symposium and the survey results indicate that many
labs, prior to the conference, did not have the DoD
reinvention vision or plan of action for pursuing waivers
conveyed to them. Many of the labs did not realize they
were obligated to communicate their goals or
accomplishments. (Jones and Thompson, 1997, p. 122) To
further illustrate, Commander Dunklin, the DON
representative at the conference, noted that he had not
received any of the mandatory quarterly reports from the
reinvention labs in fourteen months.
Another major issue that became evident at the
symposium was the fact that although it is a requirement for
each lab, many labs did not have access to the Internet.
Additionally, representatives made it clear that they were
unaware that they were required to construct a web page and
to advise their respective service/agency coordinators as to
their universal resource locator (URL) . This point became
painfully obvious in conducting the logistics survey as
well. The labs are suppose to keep their respective chain
of command, including DoD/OSD, advised on their current e-
mail address. Unfortunately, the master lab e-mail
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maintained by the Office of Performance Improvement and
Management Reegineering, OSD is badly out of date as many
labs fail to keep DoD/OSD notified of their current address
and points of contact . This lack of understanding of the
vision and goals of DoD Reinvention have compounded to
hamper networking and sharing of ideas and, ultimately, have
reduced the potential that reinvention DoD-wide could have
obtained.
e. Establishing Performance Standards to Track,
Control and Adjust Direction of Organization
A major problem with DoD initiatives is the lack
of solid data to demonstrate success. The 1997 Reinvention
Symposium, the logistic survey responses, the Reinventing
the Department of Defense September 1996 and Defense
Performance Review Reinvention Laboratory Summary all
provide initiatives that do not have any quantifiable
measurements of savings included. DoD agencies with broad
missions have a greater challenge than corporate, for-profit
organizations. Traditional performance measures such as
profit, Return on Investment (ROD and Economic Value Added
(EVA) are aimost or completely irrelevant within the
majority of DoD s activities. Costs are hard to measure,
but this can be overcome; benefits are much harder to
measure. As Harrington states:
Without measurement, you cannot control it. If
you cannot control it, you cannot manage it. If
you cannot manage it, you cannot improve it.
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With the push for performance -based objectives to be
accomplished by government agencies, leaders are going to
have to establish methods for quantifying and subsequently
justifying their results in comparison to their costs. Two
common ways of measuring process performance when other
tangible quantitative measures cannot be utilized are
customer involvement and benchmarking. Obtaining and
documenting customer input with regard to satisfaction of
performance, organizational responsiveness, and product
quality improvement, if done right, can provide effective
measures for establishing current status and future
objectives. Unique organizations can, additionally, use
quantitative analysis of past performance (benchmarking) to
set goals and objectives for which process improvement can
be implemented. The bottom-line objective is that all
organizations should continuously use some types of measures
of effectiveness to assess their current status, establish
goals, and ensure processes are meeting customer
expectations
.
DDSP sought out industry's best and benchmarked
their measurements. Defense Personnel Support Center used
their own past to measure the success of their new Prime
Vendor Program. The Air Force's Action Workout Team taped
and measured the unit they were assisting to establish a
baseline for their change efforts.
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f. An Understanding of the Obstacle to Change
and Persistence in Overcoming Them
For most labs, "not accepting no" became a mindset
with their initiatives. Resistance, in one form or another,
faced the majority of the labs every step of the way. As
one reinvention lab stated in its response, "It would be
refreshing for (organization) and DoD to look for a way to
say yes vice no" . Reinvention and reengineering by its
definition mean starting new; in government this equates to
friction. Reengineering means to start over in rebuilding
work processes, not to modify the current process.
Reinvention means to recreate service market strategy or
the organization's strategic planning and market research.
(Jones and Thompson, 1997, p. 17)
Labs that identified and judiciously planned early
in the process to overcome predictable impediments to change
generally had an easier time. Planning and persistence in
pushing the initiatives enabled labs to obtain greater
progress and reach higher levels of improvement.
Jerry Clemens of DDDS communicated the persistency
his organization had in their efforts to install what should
be an obvious cost savings initiative -- the closed loop
recycling process. Encountering many DLA policies, DoD
regulations, Presidential Orders and statutes, his
organization constantly looked for ways around these "walls"
of resistance. Clemens described this as "thinking outside
the box."
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DeVincentis of DPSC reported a great example of
resistance that would not break. For a long period of time,
DPSC had attempted to get the services to standardize food
ordering methods
.
The services want the convenience and
associated cost savings from this proposed initiative.
However, they will not standardize the way they order.
Electronic ordering, in addition to cost savings, would have
streamlined order processing time, and reduced staffing and
storage space for the inventory.
Persistence in reinvention cannot be
overemphasized. Long time followers of DoD reinvention
efforts, Professor Lawrence R. Jones and Professor Fred
Thompson sum up the need for persistence with the
reinvention process within DoD:
While DoD ' s stated philosophy is that the burden
of proof rests with the regulators to show why a
waiver should not be granted, rather than on the
Reinvention Laboratory to show why a waiver is
needed, that is evidently not how many of the
regulators see it . The typical experience of the
symposium participants was that they had to
convince the regulators beyond a shadow of a doubt
that the waiver was a good idea -- in some cases,
not just for them, but the entire DoD, which
misses the whole point of the lab exercise!
g. Recognition of Successes and Extraordinary
Efforts
As in any public or private organization, publicly
recognizing successes and the people behind them is critical
for continued improvement within the organization. The
Reinvention Labs are no exception. The initial spirit of
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the Reinvention Lab was to empower the "front-line" worker
with the intimate knowledge to offer suggests to improve the
workplace. Through public recognition, it was hoped that a
synergistic attitude towards improvement would develop.
The Hammer Award and the Presidential Quality
Award are two positive ways DoD can celebrate and reward
people for their efforts. In addition to the Hammer Award
(described on p. 42), is the Presidential Quality Award.
This award is DoD s equivalent to private industries'
Malcolm Baldridge Award.
Leaders need to be aware of the importance of
rewards and the level at which they are given. National
recognition is very important to unit commanders /managers
.
However, many workers are more inspired when rewarded for
their excellence in front of their peers. This creates a
positive spirit of competition and unit pride.
DoD is trying to be more like the private sector.
With the creation of more financial incentive programs, DoD
civilians have the opportunity to benefit from both cash and
non-monetary rewards for exceptional service and innovation.
Unfortunately for the services, with the exception of spot
promotions by ' senior level officers, they are restricted to
non-monetary incentives.
At the 1997 Reinvention Conference and in the
logistics survey, many labs expressed frustration with the
level of attention their efforts were getting at both their
local command and service-wide. One lab representative
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stated that their senior leadership "... wants to appear to
be involved with the least possible effort." (Jones and
Thompson, 1997, p. 132)
h. Institutionalizing a Continuous Improvement
Mindset and Willingness to Experiment
When the Air Force described their reinvention
program, they indicated that process improvement was a
constant procedure across the service. Their belief was
that reinvention should not be something unique. It should
be an everyday mindset at every level. (Witt, 1997) This
point is one others would do well to emulate.
Unfortunately, with the current resource constraints and
down-sizing of DoD, most units are heavily burdened and they
fight fires to do their daily mission. Tunnel vision drives
out "outside of the box" thinking.
Jeffrey Goldstein, of the NPR staff, explained at
the symposium' that, "... successful labs will not declare
victory and quit after reinventing one process, but will
continue on the path of change -- moving from one success to
success." (Jones and Thompson, 1997, p. 132) The Action
Workout Team exhibited this mindset. Even though their
purpose is to be "reinvention" consultants, they still go
the extra step in energizing and training local units to
spread the wealth of knowledge. Jerry Clemens and DDDS also
exhibited the continuous improvement mindset . The
organization started with recycling wood, then cardboard,
and now is working on 100 percent closed-loop recycling at
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all major FORSCOM bases. Debbie Ruiz stated that after
MCRD s success, they were going to push their lessons
learned to Camp Lejeune and start looking for other
financial areas to improve. Success is contagious as long
as leadership continues to support and celebrate it.
At the other extreme, numerous labs have
terminated. Some achieved their goals and saw no others to
pursue. Others attempted to ride the reinvention wave and
to push forward innovation, but met with friction. As a
result, their spirit of innovation was drained. Sadly, many
of these once highly motivated individuals succumbed to
simply "doing the job" and quit fighting "the system". The
greatest loss is not the fact that their reinvention waiver
was not approved; it is that their vitality to continuously
seek improvements was dashed.
2 . Factors Impeding Potential Success for Logistics
Reinvention Laboratories
Based on all of the research and information collected
from the Lab representatives at the DoD Reinvention
Laboratory Symposium and through the logistics survey, the
following barriers to reinvention and suggestions to correct
or lessen their impact were identified:
a. Problem: Untimely Processing of DoD Waivers
Potential Resolution;
• Reinstitute mandatory approval/disapproval
within 30 days.
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• If unable to meet this time guideline, increase
time allotted to 6 days. However, do not keep
sliding back time requirement and stick to
newly established guideline once instituted.
b. Problem: Absence of Clearly Defined Rules
for the Waiver Request and Approval
Process .
Potential Resolution;
• Services need to create one master requirements
list. Once done, Service Chief of Staffs or
DLA equivalent needs to ensure that this waiver
request is "the document" that all commands
use. Instructions must be issued to ensure
that non-uniform modifications are kept to a
minimum at all levels.
• Provide guidance on one central location on the
web. Create a process handbook that answers
most common questions. (Kent, 1997)
c. Problem: Bureaucratic Resistance to Change
Potential Resolution;
• No perfect answer exists.
• Resistance to change can be reduced through
continuous "selling" of entrepreneurial
benefits; instituting an efficiency and
effectiveness mindset at all levels everyday;
celebrating success and using incentives.
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d. Problem: Poor Communication and Information
Dissemination
Potential Resolution;
• Implement and maintain a "lessons learned" and
points of contact "warehouse". (Burnham, 1997)
• Use links to connect all of the current
disjointed information centers. This should be
done at all levels of DoD.
• Investing time and money early in the planning
and executing of information dissemination can
save tremendous effort in the long run. Senior
reinvention coordinators should attempt to
"push" information and "pull" the Laboratories'
thirst for information. Make it a requirement
that if Labs want to access the DoD Reinvention
data base, receive the latest reinvention
electronic newspaper, etc. that they have to
input their current e-mail address, update the
waivers they are pursuing and any other
information required by the service/agency
coordinators. This will produce a win-win
environment. The key is that the senior
service/agency coordinator has to make the
newspaper and data base attractive so that it
would be wanted by the Labs
.
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e. Problem: Absence of Financial and
Human Resources to Implement
Reinvention
Potential Resolution;
• DoD does not fund a "best ideas" program.
Commands, like TRADOC, should be benchmarked in
handling lack of resource issues. Programs
like BOLD and B- SMART (Ch. V.B.2.a.(l).) should
be benchmarked. Realizing that there are
current statutes preventing this, an initiative
that would provide an incentive to commands
with the most noteworthy planned initiatives or
highest savings return would be beneficial. An
incentive program DoD-wide could be initiated,
with congressional approval, where the award
money obtained from savings is made available
in future years. This type of system would
provide a win-win atmosphere for Reinvention
Labs and DoD. The current program provides
little incentive as organizations pay out of
pocket when implementing change. Additionally,
they reap no benefits beyond the current fiscal
year from achieved savings.
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• Educate leadership about Reinvention.
• Train junior officers and civilians early- in
their career in the lessons of reinvention.
• Reduce organizational fear of taking a well-
analyzed and calculated risk, continuously sell
entrepreneurial benefits and showing examples
of organizational success.
g. Problem: Absence of a Single Point of
Contact in DoD, the Services, and
Agencies that Promulgate Guiding
Principles for Reinvention.
Potential Resolution:
Reduce number of POC's and provide clear
direction to those that remain.
Senior leadership is critical here. Only when
senior leadership, i.e. service Chiefs of
Staff, direct this to happen will the number of
POCs be reduced.
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h. Problem: Insufficient Knowledge and Training
on Defining and Applying
Entrepreneurial Ideas Including How
to Restructure , Reengineer,
Reinvent, Realign, and Rethink
Organizations to Achieve Process
Improvements, and Cost Saving and
Instill Permanent, Continuous
Improvement Philosophies . (Jones
and Thompson, 1996, p.l).
Potential Resolution:
• Increase education and training.
• Creation of AWO Teams similar to the Air Force.
Teams may be created at varying levels
depending on the overall need of organization.
• Use of consultants expert in the areas of
reinvention to assist Labs, especially at the
beginning of the change process, but also








The purpose of this thesis is to examine the logistical
successes and other accomplishments of the Department of
Defense Reinvention Laboratories and the impediments these
Laboratories have faced in their efforts to improve
efficiency and effectiveness. This chapter answers the
primary and secondary research questions based upon the
information developed in the thesis research. Additionally,
advice for further research on DoD Reinvention Laboratories
is provided.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following are the conclusions of this research:
1. Logistics Reinvention Has Achieved Moderate
Results within DoD.
DoD Reinvention Laboratories hold immense potential for
DoD to increase effectiveness and efficiency through
restructuring, reengineering, reinventing, realigning and
rethinking. With the second largest number of Labs,
logistics has shown some of the greatest achievements
documented to date. However, limited sharing of these
successes and lack of leadership and resource support have




Repeated Lessons of Reinvention
Many new labs attempting to implement change fail to
achieve complete success due to their inability to identify
critical factors that influence their outcome.
3. Barriers to Logistics Reinvention Exist
Barriers exist which extend beyond the area of
logistics reinvention. Until organizations plan for and
attempt to minimize the affects of universal impediments,
they will continue to meet failure and limit the success
they can achieve through reengineering and reinvention.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
These areas identified during the research are
suggestions for DoD in exploiting the tremendous improvement
capability that reengineering and reinvention possess:
1. Benchmark Lab Successes Identified and Pursue DoD-
Wide Implementation
The researchers recommended that the DoD and OSD "push
success stories to be benchmarked and implemented DoD-wide,
as feasible, by other similar labs or organizations. Through
active "piggy backing" of these successful initiatives, DoD
can amplify and build upon the successes in improving
streamlining, quality and performance improvements.
Senior leadership must "champion" the reinvention cause
if it is truly flourish. If doubts exist leadership should
conduct cost-benefit analysis. The savings of reinvention
to date justify the investment in the more promising
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innovations for change. The future demands of meeting Joint
Vision 2010 will require greater efficiency, effectiveness
and flexibility in our logistics organization.
Additionally, increased resource savings will allow greater
pursuit in investment in the modernization of our forces.
Resource savings of $342,524,730 by the following five
successful reinvention labs initiatives provide a snapshot
of potential benefits to DoD
:
a. DDSP Closed Loop Wood Recycling
Total Savings: $8.4 million in annual savings
achieved.
• $2.0 million in landfill costs avoided
• $2.9 million in costs for new pallets avoided
• $0.6 million in costs for dimension lumber
saved
• $2.9 million in packaging material costs
saved
Jb. MCRD San Diego Direct Deposit
Total savings: $1.7 million in annual cost savings
• $780,000 per year savings in eliminating
requirement to process and mail 500,000
paychecks
• $100,000 savings in purchasing, issuing and
processing traveler checks
• 2.5 training days now available for other
training requirements
• Six full time front line workers shifted to
other tasks (estimated 12,000 man-hours per
year)
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c. Air Force Action Workout
At McDill AFB Medical Facility savings were
• 4.4 hours saved per patient to
perform scheduling and administrative
functions
.
• 900 foot reduction in patient movement
distance
• 7.0 miles travel distance on average per
patient
The B-1B Maintenance Program savings were:
• 50% reduction in required maintenance man-
hours -- saving 48 hours per lubrication and
service
• 2.6 mile reduction in travel distance to
complete maintenance action
d. Defense Personnel Support Center Business
Practices Reengineering - Prime Vendor
Total savings: $20.1 million in annual cost
savings
• $1.4 million in personnel costs were saved by
eliminating 54 positions
• 144,000 total square feet of warehouse space
was no longer required at four sites
• A reduction in $18 million in inventory was
obtained and the 700,000 annual carrying
costs were eliminated
e. IMPAC CARD
• Total savings from just the four services:
$312,324,730.00
4 . hours saved per order processed
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2. Include Lessons Extracted From Reinvention
Successes in Planning Process.
This study identified eight recurring elements which
span organizational size and functional boundaries and are
key to achieving successful organizational change. The
author recommends that new labs seeking improvement through
reinvention or reengineering incorporate these elements
early in their planning phase. New labs must continually
validate the level of support given to the following key
aspects or practices to ensure success with general
management and logistics reinvention:
a) Acquiring the commitment of top leadership.
b) Developing a meaningful and clear vision and a
plan of action to accomplish the reinvention goals
of the organization.
c) Creating a sense of urgency to accomplishing the
goals of reinvention.
d) Communicating the vision, goals, and plan of
action to everyone in the organization.
e) Identifying obstacles to reinvention and
persistently finding a way to overcome them
through entrepreneurial thinking, planning, and
risk taking actions.
f) Establishing means of measuring performance.
Measure performance and adjust the process to
incorporate corrections.
g) Publicize success and recognize people for their
efforts
.
h) Institutionalize the process of continuous




3 . New Labs or Institutions Pursuing Change Need to
Proactively Plan for Barriers to Reinvention.
The author recommends that the following barriers to
logistics reinvention and the suggestions to overcome them,
as identified in this thesis, are studied and incorporated
into plans prior to executing process or organizational
change
:
a. Problem: Untimely Processing of DoD Waivers
Potential Resolution:
• Reinstitute mandatory approval/disapproval
within 3 days.
• If necessary, increase time allotted but ensure
new timeline is adhered to.
Jb. Problem: Absence of Clearly Defined Rules




• Create and support one uniform waiver master
requirements list for services and DoD.
• Provide guidance on reinvention process in one
central location on the web. Include a process
handbook that answers common questions. (Kent,
1997)
c. Problem: Bureaucratic Resistance to Change
Potential Resolution:
• Reduce resistance to change by continuous
"selling" of entrepreneurial benefits;
instituting an efficiency and effectiveness
mindset at all levels everyday; celebrating
success and using incentives.
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d. Problem: Poor Communication and Information
Dissemination
Potential Resolution;
• Implement and maintain a "lessons learned" and
points of contact "warehouse". (Burnham, 1997)
• Use links to connect all of the current
disjointed information centers.
• Invest time and money early in the planning and
executing of information dissemination.
DoD/OSD reinvention staff needs to create win-
win environment with information pipeline that
drives labs to demand continuous access to
reinvention information tools and ensures
DoD/OSD database up-to-date.
e. Problem: Absence of Financial and
Human Resources to Implement
Reinvention
Potential Resolution :
• Establish DoD-wide reinvention "best ideas'
investment program.





• Educate leadership about Reinvention.
• Train junior officers and civilians early in
their career in the lessons of reinvention.
• Reduce organizational fear of taking a well-
analyzed and calculated risk, continuously sell
entrepreneurial benefits and showing examples
of organizational success.
g. Problem: Absence of a Single Point of
Contact in DoD, the Services, and
Agencies that Promulgate Guiding
Principles for Reinvention.
Potential Resolution;
• Reduce number of POC's and provide clear
direction to those that remain.
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h. Problem: Insufficient Knowledge and Training
on Defining and Applying
Entrepreneurial Ideas Including How
to Restructure , Reengineer,
Reinvent, Realign, and Rethink
Organizations to Achieve Process
Improvements, and Cost Saving and
Instill Permanent, Continuous
Improvement Philosophies . (Jones
and Thompson, 1996, p.l) .
Potential Resolution;
• Increase education and training.
• Create AWO Teams similar to the Air Force.
• Use expert consultants to assist in change
process
.
These barriers and approaches to resolution are also
not unique to logistics reinvention. They are common to all
functions within DoD and to private industry attempting to
reengineer and reinvent their organizations.
D . SUMMARY
The future demands of meeting Joint Vision 2010 will
require greater efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility in
our logistics organizations. Reengineering and reinvention
are making streamlining, quality, and performance
improvements. Given the decreasing buying power of the DoD
budget, significant emphasis is being placed on logistics to
help pay for the investment in the modernization of our
forces. The estimated dollar savings alone from the five
initiatives ($342,524,730.00) indicates that business
improvements in logistics can make a sizable difference. To
quote Paul G. Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology) in The 1995 Department of
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Defense Logistics Strategic Plan, it is through these
savings in, "engineering costs out of the logistics tail
that will enable DoD to become more efficient and effective,
invest in its future (modernize) and meet the future
challenges our nation will face." (Kaminski, 1995, p. 9)
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis examined the accomplishments of Reinvention
Laboratories. It benchmarked innovative logistics
initiatives and confirmed previous lessons learned about
elements that enhance or impede successful
reinvention/reengineering initiatives. Additional research
is required to document the staying power of reinvention in
DoD. Critics already are stating that, like TQM,
reinvention is losing or has lost its senior level support,
if it ever had it in the first place. As more data becomes
available, a better cost-benefit analysis of the Reinvention
Labs should be conducted. Secondly, specific studies should
be done to see how different sized and functional
organizations are affected by selected impediments. Third,
a cost benefit analysis should be performed on the
implementation of DoD reinvention communication, e.g., an
improved data base for reinvention and other means to





FOR "FRONT -LINE" REPRESENTATIVES




From: Professor Lawrence R. Jones
To: Department of Defense Reinvention Labs
Subj : REINVENTION LAB LOGISTICS
Hello,
We documented the DoD Reinvention Laboratory Symposium sponsored
by the DoD Comptroller, Office of Performance Improvements and
Management Reengineering (PI&MR) held in Rosslyn, Virginia January 26-
31, 1997. We were impressed with the numerous examples of truly
innovative success stories shared by the reinvention laboratories. This
survey follows-up on the information obtained during the symposium.
Through your assistance, we hope to provide the PI&MR Office, and the
Service NPR offices, greater insight into how the reinvention and waiver
review process could be improved.
This survey focuses exclusively on your Lab's logistics and
transportation waivers:
- Please briefly answer the following eleven questions. We would
appreciate the attachment to your response any material that amplifies





Have you been able to make any changes as a result of your
participation as a reinvention lab?
A. If no, why not?
2. If yes, Have you reported the results of your reinvention efforts?
Specifically,
a. What are the benefits?
Cost savings, manpower hours saved, steps or functions
reduced, other performance improvements;
b. What metrics have been used to estimate performance?
c. What are the front-loaded costs to your unit?
d. What incentives to reinvent have been present in your command?
e. Who are the champions or key support personnel for reinvention
in your command or elsewhere?
3 Describe your best reinvention success story or stories in terms of
achievements, cost savings, cost avoidance and other efficiencies
achieved.
4 Describe the most serious impediments to successful
reinvention/process improvement.
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5. Please rank the barriers to your reinvention efforts as listed
below:
a. Disincentive to reinvent
(Rank as appropriate: highest to lowest i.e. 5 - greatest
problem, 1 - least problem)
Up front costs 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Anticipated funds lost 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Loss of jobs 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
b. Absence of resources (personnel or financial)
for reinvention 5 4 3 2 1 N/A




Are you aware of the new waiver guidelines for DoD regulations
published by Dr. William Hamre, DoD Comptroller?
7. What problems have you had with the waiver process for:
a. Waivers to Department of Defense regulations?
b. Waivers to Service level regulations?
c. Waivers to Internal command level regulations?
8. Please rank the barriers to the waiver process listed below:
(Rank as appropriate: highest to lowest i.e. 5 - greatest
problem, 1 - least problem)
a. Support for waivers from:
Senior DoD leadership 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Service leadership 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Internal command leadership 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
b. Rules imposed by external statutes or commands
5 4 3 2 1 N/A
c. Perceived lack of knowledge or experience about waiver process
or procedures at
:
DoD level 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Service level 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Internal command level 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
d. Absence of communication or shared experience on waivers via:
Internet 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
Data base of lessons learned, 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
similar waivers and etc.
Points of contact list 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
9. What suggestions do you have to improve the waiver process?
10. If you had any suggestions or comments to a new lab what would they
be?




What additional DoD level support could the Office of Improvements
and Management Reengineering Department provide your organization?
Your assistance in compiling this information is greatly appreciated.
Please respond to this survey via e-mail by 23 July 1997 . Send your
response to:





Any questions of comments on this survey should be directed to:













From: Professor Lawrence R. Jones and Captain Todd M. Jenkins
To: Reinvention Laboratory Senior Coordinators
Sponsored by the Department of Defense and conducted by the Naval
Postgraduate School, we documented the Department of Defense Reinvention
Laboratory Symposium sponsored by the DOD Comptroller, Office of
Performance Improvements and Management Reengineering (PI&MR) held in
Rosslyn, Virginia January 26-31, 1997. We then followed up with a
survey, focused on logistics, to document the numerous impressive
accomplishments noted at the symposium. A copy of this survey, was
forwarded to all of your offices to ensure that you were kept abreast of
the questions we were asking your laboratories.
Having worked hard the last couple of months on obtaining the
thoughts and suggestions of the various reinvention laboratories, we
have gained a greater understanding of what it takes to get data,
maintain an accurate e-mail list, and work with a diverse group of
organizations. We would now like to ask the senior leaders of the
Department of Defense, who oversee the reinvention efforts, to provide
thoughts on the reinvention process as a whole.
In conducting the survey, many positive outcomes of reinvention
were discovered. We were impressed with the overall spirit and
innovation of the Reinvention Laboratories. As with any organization,
where conflicting opinions arise, a few negative trends also were
documented in the laboratories in pursuit of change . Our hopes are to
include in this research your expertise and opinions on how the
challenging and dynamic Reinvention Waiver and General Process has
operated. We want to reassure you that credit will be given to any
positive suggestions and, more importantly, that any negative comments
will be held in the strictest confidence. No names or organizations
will be used with the documentation of trends or in the publication of






1. In attempting to implement reinvention, what were the most
difficult challenge you faced:
a) Absence of resources (manpower, money, time)
.
b) Creating or maintaining a database (waiver tracking,
list of points of contact)
.
c) Creating a web page (with links to key resources or to
save you time by disseminating information or answering many of the
common questions you have already answered)
.
d) Ensuring waiver timelines were met.
e) Dealing with cultural resistance to change.
f) Working to change regulatory statutes or laws.
2
.
Who were your greatest champions who helped you in the
reinvention process?
3. Did you ever feel like you were not getting the support you
needed to ensure the fullest chance of success? (Yes or No will suffice
-- greater amplification would be appreciated)
.
4 Were there any negative trends noted with the Reinvention
Laboratories in processing waivers?
5. What do you feel are your greatest accomplishments? (We would
appreciate it if you attached any previously prepared material that






In looking back with the experience you have acquired, what
would you do differently in your position to stimulate reinvention?
7 What suggestions or comments to a successor taking over your
job would you offer?
8. Do you feel that the Reinvention Lab process has lost any
momentum? (If so, what key events, loss of people, or other factors
have slowed the initiative?)
Your assistance in compiling this information is greatly appreciated.
Please respond to this survey via e-mail by 1 November 1997. Send your
response to:
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Any questions of comments on this survey should be directed to:







Balasabas, Kristin, (1997) , Welcome /Overview of FORSCOM HO
Change Management Programs , Presentation at the DOD
Reinvention Laboratories Symposium in Washington, DC
on January 27, 1997.
Brown, Jane, U. S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment
Station, Response to Front-Line Survey dated July 23,
1997.
Bryson, John M. , Strategic Planning for Public and Non-
profit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and
Sustaining Organizational Achievement , Jossey-Bass
Publishers, San Francisco, 1995.
Burnham, Shirley, DCSRE, Army Forces Command, Response to
"Front-Line" Survey dated August 19, 1997.
CATO Handbook for Congress, "The 1998 Defense Budget".
Internet World Wide Web Address
(http
:
//www. cato . org/pubs/handbook/hbl05-7 .html)
Clemens, Jerry, (January 27, 1997), Defense Distribution
Depot Susguehanna Pennsylvania (DDSP) Reinvention Lab
Memorandum, New Cumberland, PA: Defense Depot,
Susquehanna, PA.
Clemens, Jerry, (1997) , Defense Distribution Depot
Susquehanna Pennsylvania (DDSP) Wood Reclamation and
Recycling Program, Special Operations
Logistics Division , Presentation, New Cumberland,
PA: Defense Distribution Depot, Susquehanna, PA.
Clinton, Bill, and Gore, Al
, (1997), Blair House Papers
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Clinton, William J., (1996) A National Security Strategy
of Engagement and Enlargement , The White House,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
159
Cohen, William S., Annual Report to the President and the
Congress , April, 1997, Department of Defense.
Cohen, William S., Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review , May, 1997, Department of Defense.
Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) , (1996) , The Food
Demonstration Project Joint Task Group Report to
Congress , Draft Report, Philadelphia,
PA: Defense Personnel support Center.
Department of Defense (DoD)
, (1996), Defense Performance
Review Reinvention Lab Summary Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Department of Defense (DoD), (1996), Reinventing the
Department of Defense , Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
DFAS Magazine OnLine, Vol. 4, No. 1, Sep 97. 1997 Customer
Service Plan . Internet World Wide Web Address
(http: //www. dfas . mil /news /dfaszine/noll997/
agencyl .htm)
DFAS Magazine OnLine, Vol. 4, No. 2, Oct 97. 1997
Customer Service Plan . Internet World Wide Web
Address (http
:
//www.dfas . mil /news /dfaszine/no219 97/
agency2 .htm.
)
DeVincentis, Mae, (1997), Reengineering Business Practices
Presentation , Philadelphia, PA: Defense Personnel
Support Center, Presentation at the DOD Reinvention
Laboratories Symposium in Washington, DC on January
28, 1997.
Disney, Diane, (1997) , Human Resources Management - DoD
Vision , Presentation at the DOD Reinvention
Laboratories Symposium in Washington, DC on January
30, 1997.
160
Dunklin, Pete, CDR, USN, (1997) , Navy Meeting ,
Presentation at the DOD Reinvention Laboratories
Symposium in Washington, DC on January 28, 1997,
Commander, United States Navy.
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Military Analysis
Network Homepage. "Frequently Asked Questions".
Internet World Wide Address
(http
:
//www. fas .org. /man/msf aq. htm and
http//www . fas . org/man/docs/qdr/sec6
. html )
.
Foster, Rachel Kopperman, (January 9, 1997), DOD
Reinvention Laboratory Symposium , Letter, The Office
of Performance Improvement and
Management Reengineering Within the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense, Comptroller.
Foster, Rachel Kopperman, (1997) , Introduction to DOD
Reinvention Laboratories Symposium , Presentation at
the DOD Reinvention Laboratories Symposium in
Washington, DC on January 27-31, 1997.
Franks, Misty, PFC, The IMPAC Credit Card is a
Reengineering Success for the Army , Immediate
Release, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) , Feb 12,






Freeman, James R. , U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, Response to "Front-Line" Representatives'
Survey dated August 5, 1997.
Giradini, Kenneth, Nany Y. Moore, Rick Eden, Carl Dahlmen,
and David Oaks, Improving Logistics: Perspectives
from RAND Research , National Defense Research
Institute and Commision on Roles & Missions of The
Armed Forces, Vol. 1., 19 95 RAND.
161
Goldstein, Jeffrey, (1997) , The Promises and Perils of the
Reinvention Labs , Presentation at the DOD Reinvention
Laboratories Symposium in Washington, DC on January
27, 1997.
Gore, Al, (19 93), From Red Tape to Results, Creating a
Government That Works Better & Costs Less, Report of
the National Performance Review Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Gore, Al
, (1993), From Red Tape to Results, Creating a -
Government That Works Better & Costs Less, Report of
the National Performance Review Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. Internet World Wide Web
Address (http
:
//sunsite . unc . edu/npr/
np (chapter) .html) , 22 Oct, 1995.
Gore, Al
,
(1994), Creating a Government That Works Better
& Costs Less, Status Report, September 1994 Report of
the National Performance Review Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Gore, Al
, (1995) , Common Sense Government Works Better &
Costs Less, Third Report of the National Performance
Review , Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Gore, Al
, (1996), The Best Kept Secrets in Government,
National Performance Review , Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Gosnell, James L. , CDR, USN, Assessment of Department of
Defense Reinvention Laboratories , Thesis, 1997.
Green, Mark, Lawrence R. Jones, and Fred Thompson, "Local
Heroes? Reinvention Labs in the Department of
Defense"
.
Griffin, Dave, SMSGT, USAF, (1997) , Air Force Action
Workout , Presentation at the DOD Reinvention
Laboratories Symposium in Washington, DC on January
28, 1997.
162
Hagemann, Don, (1997) , Future FORSCOM Challenges ,
Presentation at the DoD Reinvention Laboratories ...
Symposium in Washington, DC on January 27, 1997.
Hammer, Michael and Champy, James, Reenqineerinq the
Corporation , Harper Business, New York: 1993.
Hammer, Michael and Stanton, Steven A. , The Reenqineerinq
Revolution , Harper Business, New York: 1995.
Hamre, John J., (April 2, 1997), Revised DOD Waiver
Policy
, .
Memorandum, Washington, DC: The Office of
Performance Improvement and Management Reengineering.
Harrington, H. J., Business Process Improvement , McGraw-
Hill, New York: 1991.
Henderson, David R., "Do We Need to Go to War for Oil?"
Foriegn Policy Briefing No. 4, October 24, 1990.
CATO Institute.
Isenberg, David, "The Misleading Military "Readiness
Crisis'. Internet World Wide Web Address
(http ://2 06.239.119 . 2/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-03 5es . html)
.
Joint Doctrine Homepage, "Joint Doctrine Story". (1997),






Jones, L.R., and Thompson, Fred, (1997), The Five R's of
the New Public Management, m L.R. Jones and Kuro
Schedler, eds
.
, International Perspectives on the New
Public Management , Greenwich, CT : JM Press.
Jones, L.R. and Thompson, Fred, (1997), DoD Reinvention
Laboratory Symposium January 27-31,1997 , Symposium
Report, 1997.
163
Kaminski, Paul G., Department of Defense Logistics
Strategic Plan, (EDITION 1995) . Prepared by the
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Logistics)
.
Kent, Ella, Head Quarters United States Army Europe,
Response to "Front-Line" Survey dated September 4,
1997.
Kuschel, Mark, MAJ, USAF, Response to Senior Coordinators
Survey dated 20 November 1997.
Laurent, Anne, "Sudden Impact", Government Executive ,
September, 1997. Internet World Wide Address
(http://www.govexec.com)
.
McMahon, Neal P., LCDR, USN, The Impact of the Purchase
Card on Increasing the Micropurchase Threshold within
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ,
Thesis, 1995.
National Performance Review Hammer Awards, (April 22,
1997) , Home Page Address
:
http : //www.dtic .dla . mil /npr/hammer . html , Internet,
Washington, DC: National Performance Review.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
(OUSD(C)), (1997), POD Reinvention Laboratories
Symposium , Notebook, Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Osborne, David, and Gaebler, Ted, (1992), Reinventing
Government, How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is
Transforming the Public Sector Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Incorporated.
Ricks, Thomas F., (February 7, 19 97), Defense Proposal
Sidesteps Difficult Questions, The Wall Street
Journal . New York, NY: Dow Jones & Company
Incorporated, pp. Al-All.
164
Ruiz, Debbie, (1997), Recruit Direct Deposit, Marine Corps
Recruit Depot, San Diego CA Presentation at the DoD
Reinvention Laboratories Symposium in Washington, DC,
on January 28, 1997.
Ruiz, Debbie, (January 24, 1997), Recruit Direct Deposit
Reinvention Initiative , Memorandum, San Diego, CA:
U.S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA.
Shalikashvili , John M., (1995) National Military Strategy,
A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement
,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Shalikashvili, John M., Joint Vision 2010 , Department of
Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Spector, Eleanor, (1997) , DOD Acquisition Reform ,
Presentation, Washington, DC: Office of the Under
^
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
Spence, Floyd D. (1997) , Military Readiness 1997:
Rhetoric and Reality . Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Strader, Jim, MAJ, (1996) , Action Workout ... An
Accelerator to Continuous Improvement , Presentation,
Langley, VA: U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command,
Major, United States Air Force.
Thompson, Fred, and Jones, L.R., (1994), Reinventing The
Pentagon, How the New Public Management Can Bring
Institutional Renewal San Francisco,
CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
, (1997), U.S. Armv
Forces Command Reinvention Center Team Meeting
Presentation, Fort McPherson, GA:
U.S. Army Forces Command.
165
U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) , (1997), The IMPAC
Credit Card is a Reenqineerinq Success for the Army ,
(Media Release), Fort McPherson, GA: U.S. Army
Forces Command.
Vagnerini, Randa M., Response to Senior Coordinators
Survey dated November 14, 1997.
Whipple, Dave, DR., (1997), Naval Postgraduate School
Status of Reinvention , The Navy's University Serving
all of DOD, Presentation, Monterey, CA:
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
Wise, John E., LTC, USA, Response to Senior Coordinators
Survey dated October 20, 1997.
166
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John L. Kingman Road, STE 0944
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218




3 . Director, Training and Education 1
MCCDC, Code C4 6
1019 Elliot Road
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5024
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center 2
MCCDC, Code C4 0RC
2 04 Broadway Street
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5017
5. Director, Studies and /Analysis Division 1
MCCDC, Code C45300 Russell Road
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5130
6 . Marine Corps Representative 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Code 037, Bldg. 234, HA-220
669 Dyer Road
Monterey, California 93943
7. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity...
1
Technical Advisory Branch
Attn: Maj J.C. Cummiskey
Box 555171
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5080








10 . Mr . and Mrs . Royal Weisel 1
574 Middlebranch Road N.E.
North Canton, Ohio 44721
167
11 . Mr . and Mrs . John Wolfe 1
3 72 9 Elbern Ave.
Whitehall, Ohio 43213
12 . Capt Todd M . Jenkins 2
574 Middlebranch Road N.E.
North Canton, Ohio 44721
13 . Professor Fred Thompson 1
Grace and Elmer Goudy Professor
of Public Management and Policy
Atkinson Graduate School of Management
Willamette University, Salem, Oregon 97301
14 . Mr . Elbert E . Witt 1
6 95 Las Palmas Way
Melbourne, Florida 32940
168
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
3 2768 00342147
